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SHOOT FIRST, LITIGATE LATER: DECLARATORY 
JUDGMENT ACTIONS, PROCEDURAL FENCING, 
AND ITCHY TRIGGER FINGERS 
ROBERT T. SHERWIN* 
Abstract 
Judges have always been suspect of declaratory judgment actions and, 
more particularly, the “mirror-image” case where the alleged wrongdoer 
takes on the role of the plaintiff. Federal courts typically point out that 
nothing in the Declaratory Judgment Act requires them to hear a request 
for declaratory relief; indeed, their jurisdiction is entirely discretionary. 
Consequently, most U.S. Courts of Appeals have developed a list of factors 
to assist lower courts in deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction over a 
declaratory judgment action or dismiss the case. One common element 
circuit courts often point to is whether the suit was brought 
“anticipatorily” by a plaintiff seeking to establish the forum of its choice, 
rather than waiting to be sued by the “natural plaintiff” in a less 
defendant-friendly forum. Courts bemoan such “races to the courthouse” 
as “disorderly” attempts at “procedural fencing.” 
Unfortunately, the courts of appeals have done an atrocious job of 
providing any meaningful or helpful guidance to lower courts and litigants 
regarding what constitutes an anticipatory lawsuit. Courts routinely 
dismiss cases seeking declaratory relief by reasoning that the plaintiff was 
trying to distort the purpose of the statute and rob the natural plaintiff of its 
chosen venue. They do so by applying a mishmash of factors and rules that 
lack any uniformity and oftentimes clash with the statute’s purpose. 
This Article attempts to bring some semblance of order to the 
“anticipatory lawsuit” exception. It does so by proposing two radical 
suggestions: First, that courts should (for the most part) forget about 
“races to the courthouse” and worry instead about factors that are easier 
to apply and anticipate. And second, that declaratory filers should have to 
give notice of their intention to file suit, thereby offering the natural 
plaintiff a fair opportunity to exercise its traditional litigation rights 
without being unfairly “beaten” to the courthouse. 
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I. Introduction 
A. A Tale of Two Cases 
On July 11, 2005, Kellogg Company—which makes and sells a crisped 
rice and marshmallow bar under the trademark “RICE KRISPIES 
TREATS”—sent a letter to the CEO of McKee Foods Corporation, which 
makes and sells a similar product under the mark “LITTLE DEBBIE 
MARSHMALLOW TREATS.”1 Kellogg accused McKee of trademark 
infringement, trade dress infringement, and false advertising and demanded 
that McKee cease and desist its various marketing efforts.
2
 The letter gave 
McKee nine days to respond.
3
 
After two months’ worth of email requests for extensions of time, 
McKee finally replied with a seven-page letter of its own denying all of 
                                                                                                                 
 * Associate Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law. The author 
would like to thank the Texas Tech Law School Foundation for its generous support. 
 1. McKee Foods Kingman v. Kellogg Co., 474 F. Supp. 2d 934, 936 (E.D. Tenn. 
2006). 
 2. Id. at 936–37. 
 3. Id. at 937. 
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Kellogg’s claims.4 The letter closed by saying, “We trust that this letter 
addresses the concerns of your client to your satisfaction. However, if you 
wish to discuss these issues further, please give me a call.”5 The very next 
day, McKee, a Tennessee company, filed a declaratory judgment action in 
its own backyard—the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Tennessee—seeking a declaration that its conduct was not infringing.6 
Kellogg moved to dismiss McKee’s action, arguing that the court should 
exercise its discretion to decline jurisdiction over the case because McKee 
was using “the declaratory remedy . . . merely for the purpose of 
‘procedural fencing’”—in other words, to beat Kellogg to the courthouse in 
order to set the forum in a place of McKee’s liking, rather than being sued 
in a far-off destination chosen by Kellogg.
7
 Specifically, Kellogg argued 
that McKee’s requests for extensions, the tone of its response (which 
invited additional dialogue), and the fact that it waited more than three 
months to inform Kellogg of the suit, were all evidence of “procedural 
gamesmanship.”8 But the court disagreed, holding with little analysis that 
there was no evidence McKee filed the case solely “to provide an arena for 
a race for res judicata.”9 In short, the court refused to dismiss.10 
Meanwhile, on June 1, 2004—about a year before the events that gave 
rise to the Rice Krispies case—“closeout” retail giant Tuesday Morning 
announced on its website that it would be selling reproductions of the work 
of famed artist Thomas Kinkade, the so-called “Painter of Light.”11 The 
Kinkade Company, under the belief that the copies Tuesday Morning 
possessed were unauthorized reproductions, telephoned and wrote the 
retailer on June 3 to inform it that the sale of the artwork would violate 
Kinkade’s rights.12 It warned Tuesday Morning—a company with its 
principal place of business in Texas—that if the parties couldn’t resolve 
their disagreement by 9 a.m. the following day, Kinkade would have no 
choice but to sue in a federal court in California for copyright infringement, 
                                                                                                                 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 936-37. 
 7. Id. at 940. 
 8. Id. at 940–41. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 941–42. 
 11. Mill Creek Press, Inc. v. The Thomas Kinkade Co., No. CIVA.3:04-CV-1213-G, 
2004 WL 2607987, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 2004); THOMAS KINKADE STUDIOS, 
https://thomaskinkade.com/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2017). 
 12. Mill Creek Press, 2004 WL 2607987, at *2. 
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trademark infringement, and false advertising.
13
 The parties’ attorneys did 
agree, however, that neither of them would actually file suit without first 
notifying the other.
14
 
On the morning of June 4, the parties all participated in a conference call 
aimed at settling the dispute.
15
 During the call, Tuesday Morning professed 
a desire for an “amicable resolution.”16 But it was also doing something else 
at the same time: filing suit on its home turf in the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Texas, seeking a declaration of non-
infringement.
17
 It proceeded through the rest of that conference call, as well 
as most of a second call later that day, without notifying Kinkade of its filed 
declaratory judgment action.
18
 
Like Kellogg in the Rice Krispies case, Kinkade asked the court to 
dismiss the case, claiming the action was “a ‘classic’ anticipatory suit.”19 It 
pointed to the parties’ active engagement in settlement discussions and the 
“swiftness” with which Tuesday Morning reacted to its realization that it 
could not settle as evidence of an intent to “deprive the party allegedly 
aggrieved of its choice of forum.”20 But unlike the Rice Krispies case, the 
judge agreed with the defendant, holding that “it appears that the plaintiffs 
were motivated to file this action by their desire to win a ‘race to the 
courthouse.’”21 Similar cases, identical arguments, different results. Why? 
B. Unfairly Anticipatory or Fair Game? 
To be sure, these cases are not identical, either factually or procedurally. 
Capable counsel, judges, and scholars can easily argue why the two, despite 
being extraordinarily similar, could result in different outcomes and yet 
stand for the exact same proposition. The cases, though, also illustrate the 
main thrust of this Article: litigants, attorneys, and judges in the federal 
court system are currently operating under a doctrine that has a 
likelihood—if not an outright tendency—of producing inconsistent results. 
                                                                                                                 
 13. Id. at *1-2, *4. 
 14. Id. at *3. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at *3-4. 
 18. Id. at *3. 
 19. Id. at *7. 
 20. Id. at *8. 
 21. Id. 
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As the two cases demonstrate, use of the federal Declaratory Judgment 
Act has become commonplace in the intellectual property context.
22
 That’s 
hardly surprising, given that these types of cases—where one party claims 
another’s behavior violates a copyright, trademark, or patent, and the 
challenged party initiates suit to prove its conduct is non-infringing—are 
precisely the sorts of scenarios the framers of the declaratory remedy 
intended it to address.
23
 
But judges have always been suspect of the declaratory remedy and, as a 
result, are not always accommodating.
24
 Federal courts typically point out 
that nothing in the Declaratory Judgment Act requires them to hear a 
request for declaratory relief; indeed, their jurisdiction is entirely 
discretionary.
25
 Consequently, most U.S. Courts of Appeals have developed 
a list of factors to assist lower courts in deciding whether to exercise 
jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action or dismiss the case.
26
 One 
common element circuit courts often point to is whether the suit was 
brought “anticipatorily” by a plaintiff seeking to establish the forum of its 
choice, rather than waiting to be sued by the “natural plaintiff” in a less 
defendant-friendly forum.
27
 Courts bemoan such “race[s] to the courthouse” 
as “disorderly” attempts at “procedural fencing.”28 
Unfortunately, the courts of appeals have done an atrocious job of 
providing any meaningful or helpful guidance to lower courts and litigants 
regarding what constitutes an anticipatory lawsuit. Of course, all 
declaratory judgment actions are anticipatory; indeed they must be in order 
                                                                                                                 
 22. See Russell B. Hill, Should Anticipation Kill Application of the Declaratory 
Judgment Act?, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 239, 242–43 (2004). Declaratory judgment actions 
are also common in many other contexts, but this Article focuses on their use in intellectual 
property cases, primarily because most motions to dismiss in those disputes focus on the 
anticipatory litigation exception. See, e.g., Am. Univ. Sys., Inc. v. Am. Univ., 858 F. Supp. 
2d 705, 711–12 (N.D. Tex. 2012) (focusing on the issue of whether a trademark case was 
filed anticipatorily rather than on the issue of whether there was a pending state court case 
involving the same issues). 
 23. Donald L. Doernberg & Michael B. Mushlin, The Trojan Horse: How the 
Declaratory Judgment Act Created a Cause of Action and Expanded Federal Jurisdiction 
While the Supreme Court Wasn’t Looking, 36 UCLA L. REV. 529, 564 (1989). 
 24. See id. at 554–55. 
 25. Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286 (1995). 
 26. Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Holmes Cty., 343 F.3d 383, 390 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 27. See id. at 390 n.2. 
 28. See Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585, 591 n.4, 593 (D.C. Cir. 1976), 
superseded by statute, Act of Aug. 27, 1982, Pub. L. No. 96-247, 96 Stat. 317 (codified as 
amended in 35 U.S.C. § 294 (2012)), as recognized in Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Consol. 
Rail Corp., 892 F.2d 1066, 1072 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
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to satisfy the “case or controversy” requirement of Article III.29 Still, courts 
routinely dismiss cases seeking declaratory relief by reasoning that the 
plaintiff was trying to distort the purpose of the statute and rob the natural 
plaintiff of its chosen venue.
30
 They do so by applying a mishmash of 
factors and rules that lack uniformity and oftentimes clash with the statute’s 
purpose.
31
 
This Article attempts to bring some semblance of order to the 
“anticipatory lawsuit” exception. Part II will explore the history and 
purpose of the federal Declaratory Judgment Act in an attempt to better 
understand why courts are unnecessarily concerned with so-called races to 
the courthouse and procedural fencing. Part III will focus on how courts 
have attempted to fashion rules to guide the exercise of their discretionary 
declaratory judgment jurisdiction. Part IV argues why courts should—for 
the most part—forget about the anticipation exception and worry instead 
about factors that are easier to apply and anticipate. Finally, Part V will 
offer two solutions to those courts unwilling to drop their objections to 
declaratory filers with itchy trigger fingers. The obvious solution is the 
establishment of clearer guidelines as to what constitutes a declaratory 
judgment action brought in bad faith. The second solution will no doubt be 
more controversial: it would require a would-be declaratory plaintiff to give 
notice of its intention to file suit, thereby offering the natural plaintiff a fair 
opportunity to exercise its traditional litigation rights without being unfairly 
“beaten” to the courthouse. 
II. The History and Purpose of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act 
To understand why courts are concerned with declaratory judgment cases 
they fear are “race[s] for res judicata,”32 it’s helpful to understand the 
                                                                                                                 
 29. See Sherwin-Williams, 343 F.3d at 391–92. 
 30. See, e.g., Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd. v. McRae, 953 F. Supp. 223, 224 (N.D. Ill. 1996) 
(“[T]he Declaratory Judgment Act’s] purpose is to avoid accrual of avoidable damages to 
one not certain of his rights, and to afford an early adjudication of whatever damages may 
have accrued when the adversary does not see fit to bring suit. It is not to give the alleged 
wrongdoer a choice of forum.”) 
 31. See, e.g., St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Trejo, 39 F.3d 585, 590–91 (5th Cir. 1994) (identifying 
seven factors, three of which duplicate each other with no explainable reason why all are 
necessary). 
 32. See, e.g., Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 746 F.2d 323, 326 (6th 
Cir. 1984) (“Courts have discouraged ‘the use of the declaratory action as a method of 
procedural fencing, or as a means to provide another arena for a race for res judicata.’” 
(citing 6A JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 57.08, at 57-50 (1st ed. 
1938)). 
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mechanism’s historical underpinnings and purpose. Declaratory relief is a 
relatively new phenomenon in American law.
33
 As Wright and Miller point 
out, “The traditional and conventional concept of the judicial process has 
been that the courts may act only when a complainant is entitled to a 
coercive remedy, such as a judgment for damages or an injunction.”34 
Consequently, it wasn’t until a dispute had matured to a point where 
damages or injunctive relief were appropriate that a court could help an 
aggrieved plaintiff.
35
 
A. The Birth and Growth of the Declaratory Remedy Abroad and at Home 
The declaratory judgment’s origins can be traced all the way back to 
ancient Rome.
36
 When early European nation-states began incorporating 
Roman law, the remedy found its way to places like medieval Germany and 
France.
37
 The law of Scotland provides the “connecting link between the 
declaratory action of the Middle Ages and modern English law,” and a 
reported opinion granting declaratory relief can be found as far back as 
1541.
38
 
Still, the declaratory judgment didn’t blossom in Great Britain until the 
late 1800s, and as a result, it failed to make the trip “across the pond” when 
early American law began to take shape in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries.
39
 Nevertheless, by 1919—when the United States 
Congress first considered the device—approximately sixty percent of 
British equity cases were brought under England’s declaratory judgment 
procedure.
40
  
As a result, despite states around the globe having utilized declaratory 
judgments for upwards of hundreds of years, they were “virtually unknown 
                                                                                                                 
 33. 10B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2751 
(4th ed. 2017) (“Actions for declaratory judgments represent a comparatively recent 
development in American jurisprudence.”); Scott L. Schmookler & Brian Bornstein, The 
Strategic Use of Declaratory Judgment Actions in Fidelity Litigation, 8 FID. L.J. 41, 43 
(2002) (discussing “the novelty of declaratory judgment”). 
 34. 10B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 33, at § 2751. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Edwin M. Borchard, The Declaratory Judgment—A Needed Procedural Reform 
[Part I], 28 YALE L.J. 1, 12–14 (1918) [hereinafter Borchard, Part I]. 
 37. Id. at 14–20. 
 38. Id. at 21-22. 
 39. Id. at 25–29. 
 40. Edwin M. Borchard, The Supreme Court and the Declaratory Judgment, 14 A.B.A. 
J. 633, 634–35 (1928) [hereinafter Borchard, Supreme Court]. 
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to American Law” until the early 1900s.41 That began to change in 1917, 
when law school Professors Edson Sunderland and Edwin Borchard began 
leading the charge to introduce declaratory judgments to American 
jurisprudence.
42
 Professor Borchard, in particular, was relentless.
43
 As the 
“leading force behind the American declaratory judgment,” he wrote no 
less than eight law review articles concerning declaratory judgments
44
 and 
spoke frequently on the topic.
45
 Courts across the country have dubbed him 
the “father of the declaratory judgment in the United States.”46 
Borchard, Sunderland, and their allies made a number of arguments 
against the common law system’s historical limitation of jurisdiction to 
cases seeking damages and injunctions.
47
 They pointed out that those 
remedies could be inadequate in an increasingly complex society and that a 
system limited to such relief was inevitably expensive, cumbersome, and 
rife with uncertainty.
48
 They observed that “social equilibrium is disturbed, 
not merely by a violation of private rights,” but also by actions that leave 
persons in “grave doubt and uncertainty” about their legal positions.49 
                                                                                                                 
 41. Doernberg & Mushlin, supra note 23, at 550. 
 42. See generally Borchard, Part I, supra note 36; Edwin M. Borchard, The Declaratory 
Judgment—A Needed Procedural Reform [Part II], 28 YALE L.J. 105 (1918) [hereinafter 
Borchard, Part II]; Edson R. Sunderland, A Modern Evolution in Remedial Rights—The 
Declaratory Judgment, 16 MICH. L. REV. 69 (1917). 
 43. Doernberg & Mushlin, supra note 23, at 550 n.93. 
 44. See, e.g., Edwin M. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments in Pennsylvania, 82 U. PA. L. 
REV. 317 (1934); Edwin M. Borchard, Judicial Relief for Peril and Insecurity, 45 HARV. L. 
REV. 793 (1932); Edwin M. Borchard & Phoebe Morrison, Declaratory Judgments in New 
Jersey, 1 MERCER BEASLEY L. REV. 1 (1932); Edwin M. Borchard, The Constitutionality of 
Declaratory Judgments, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 561 (1931); Edwin M. Borchard, The 
Declaratory Judgment in the United States, 37 W. VA. L.Q. 127 (1931); Edwin M. Borchard, 
Declaratory Judgments, 3 U. CIN. L. REV. 24 (1929); Borchard, Supreme Court, supra note 
40; Borchard, Part II, supra note 42; Borchard, Part I, supra note 36. 
 45. Doernberg & Mushlin, supra note 23, at 550 n.93. 
 46. Id. at 551 n.93; see, e.g., Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 108 F.3d 999, 1013 (9th 
Cir. 1997), vacated on reh’g en banc, 133 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1998); United States Fid. & 
Guar. Co. v. Koch, 102 F.2d 288, 290 (3d Cir. 1939); Panama Processes S.A. v. Cities Serv. 
Co., 362 F. Supp. 735, 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff’d, 496 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1974); Mayor of El 
Dorado v. El Dorado Broad. Co., 544 S.W.2d 206, 214 (Ark. 1976) (Fogleman, J., 
dissenting); Lloyd v. Campbell, 189 N.E.2d 660, 669 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1963), aff’d in part 
and rev’d in part, 196 N.E.2d 786 (Ohio Ct. App. 1964). 
 47. Doernberg & Mushlin, supra note 23, at 551. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 551–52 (quoting Borchard, Part I, supra note 36, at 2). 
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In the reformers’ view, a system that offered only “remedial 
adjudication”50 suffered from three structural problems: 
First, it failed to address the plight of a person embroiled in a 
dispute who, limited by traditional remedies, could not have the 
controversy adjudicated because the opposing party had the sole 
claim to traditional relief and chose not to use it. Second, the 
traditional system of remedies harmed parties by forcing them to 
wait an unnecessarily long time before seeking relief. Third, the 
reformers criticized the harshness of damage and injunctive 
awards. Even when they could be invoked, they were thought to 
hamper litigants who did not need or desire coercive relief.
51
 
To address these problems, Borchard and Sunderland argued for the 
creation of a remedy that would effectively expand jurisdiction in two 
ways: first, by permitting a “role reversal” from the traditional casting of 
parties—that is, allowing one party to a dispute to sue the other, even when 
that other party is the one who is traditionally aggrieved; and second, by 
permitting courts to hear claims sooner than might otherwise be possible—
that is, requiring only that a genuine dispute exist between the parties, 
rather than some definite violation of a right.
52
 
Even though many agreed with Borchard and Sunderland’s articulations 
of the problems with a declaratory judgment-less system, these expansions 
of jurisdiction were a bridge too far for most courts and federal legislators.
53
 
The first federal Declaratory Judgment Act was proposed in 1919
54
 but was 
never enacted.
55
 Despite being introduced in every session of Congress 
from 1919 to 1932, it wasn’t until 1934, fifteen years after its original 
introduction, that declaratory judgment actions finally became law.
56
  
In the meantime, states began passing their own declaratory judgment 
statutes. By 1920, three states (Wisconsin, Florida, and Michigan) had 
passed declaratory judgment laws, while four other states (Connecticut, 
Maryland, New Jersey, and Rhode Island) had passed more limited 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Samuel L. Bray, Preventive Adjudication, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1276 (2010). 
 51. Doernberg & Mushlin, supra note 23, at 552–53 (footnotes omitted). 
 52. Id. at 554–55. 
 53. Id. 
 54. S. 5304, 65th Cong. (3d Sess. 1919). 
 55. Doernberg & Mushlin, supra note 23, at 554, 561. 
 56. Id. at 561. The bill actually passed the United States House of Representatives in 
1926, 1928, and 1932. Id. at 561 n.148 (citing H.R. 4624, 72d Cong. (1932); H.R. 5623, 70th 
Cong. (1928); H.R. 5365, 69th Cong. (1926)). 
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statutes.
57
 In 1922, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws amended a 
proposed Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act.
58
 By the time Congress 
finally passed the federal statute in 1934, a majority of states had a 
declaratory judgment act.
59
 By 1949, only Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
and Oklahoma were without one.
60
 
B. The Supreme Court’s Role 
The Supreme Court owns most of the blame for the federal law’s slow 
passage.
61
 In a trio of cases decided in 1927 and 1928, the Court rejected 
various declaratory judgment requests, mostly on Article III “case-or-
controversy” grounds.62 The last of the three, Willing v. Chicago 
Auditorium Ass’n, was certainly the most harmful to the declaratory 
judgment movement.
63
 In that case, the long-term lessee-operator of the 
Chicago Auditorium was locked in an argument with the landowner over 
whether the lessee could tear down the building—which the lessee had 
itself built—to construct something larger.64 The lessee sued in Illinois state 
court for a declaration to resolve the dispute.
65
 The lessor-defendants 
removed the case to federal court and then moved to dismiss.
66
 Ultimately, 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Id. at 555 n.117. 
 58. Id. at 557, 561 n.148. The first uniform act was proposed in 1920. NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL 
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 188 (1920). But that same year, 
the Supreme Court of Michigan handed down its decision in Anway v. Grand Rapids 
Railway Co., 179 N.W. 350 (Mich. 1920). There, the court “reacted harshly to what it saw as 
the frightening implications of a procedure permitting” a declaratory judgment. Doernberg & 
Mushlin, supra note 23, at 556. In a “lengthy and scathing rejection,” the court held 
Michigan’s statute unconstitutional because it permitted “determinations of abstract 
propositions of law,” thereby conferring nonjudicial power on the courts. Id. at 556-57 
(quoting Anway, 179 N.W. at 355). Recognizing the danger Anway posed to any new state 
laws, the Commission amended the uniform statute to authorize only cases already within 
the courts’ “respective jurisdictions.” Id. at 557. “This amendment was intended to signal 
what the drafters thought apparent: the declaratory judgment is not designed to permit 
adjudication of moot cases or rendition of advisory opinions.” Id. at 557–58. 
 59. Id. at 561 n.148. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 558. 
 62. Willing v. Chi. Auditorium Ass’n, 277 U.S. 274, 284 (1928); Liberty Warehouse 
Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers’ Co-op Mktg. Ass’n, 276 U.S. 71, 89 (1928); Liberty 
Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70, 76 (1927). 
 63. Borchard, Supreme Court, supra note 40, at 635. 
 64. Willing, 277 U.S. at 284–85. 
 65. Id. at 287–88. 
 66. Id. at 283–84. 
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the Supreme Court held that the case should have been dismissed because 
the facts did not present “a case or controversy within the meaning of 
article 3 of the Constitution.”67 This was true, according to the Court, even 
though the question presented was not abstract, the case was not moot, the 
parties were adverse, and the plaintiff had a substantial, definite and 
specific interest in the declaration it sought.
68
 
The Supreme Court’s trilogy of cases in 1927 and 1928 thus served as a 
“judicial check” on the federal bill’s passage.69 It wasn’t until five years 
later, when the Supreme Court performed an about-face, that the landscape 
changed. In Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway v. Wallace, a 
railroad brought a case in Tennessee state court seeking a declaration under 
that state’s Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act that an excise tax violated 
the Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment.
70
 The Tennessee 
Supreme Court denied relief, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
specifically on the question of “whether a case or controversy is presented, 
in view of the nature of the proceedings in the state courts.”71 
Notwithstanding its previous opinions, the decision of the Court was 
unanimous.
72
 Ushering in an entirely new era of jurisprudence, it held “the 
Constitution does not require that the case or controversy should be 
presented by traditional forms of procedure, invoking only traditional 
remedies.”73 Opining that the railroad’s case was “real and substantial,” the 
Court held that it had the constitutional power to decide the merits.
74
 
C. The Intent of Congress  
Following the Supreme Court’s blessing of “preventive adjudication,”75 
Congress finally passed the federal Declaratory Judgment Act in 1934.
76
 
                                                                                                                 
 67. Id. at 289. 
 68. Id. at 289–90. 
 69. Note, Declaratory Relief in the Supreme Court, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090 
(1932). “The strong statements by the Supreme Court in these . . . cases to the effect that 
courts established under Article III of the Constitution could not be called upon to render a 
declaratory decision seem effectually to have forestalled congressional action upon 
declaratory judgments.” Id. 
 70. 288 U.S. 249, 258 (1933). 
 71. Id. at 259. 
 72. Id. at 258, 268. 
 73. Id. at 264. 
 74. Id. at 264–65. 
 75. Bray, supra note 50, at 1276. 
 76. Act of June 14, 1934, ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–
2202 (2012)). In relevant part, the statute reads: 
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Interestingly, it did so “without any hearings and with virtually no 
discussion.”77 Still, having held three hearings on identical legislation in the 
1920s, there’s a fair bit of legislative history on which to rely to discern the 
intent of Congress.
78
 And that history reveals that Congress, in passing the 
statute, intended to expand courts’ jurisdiction79 over two types of cases 
that theretofore could not be heard: the “federal-defense” case, and the 
“mirror-image” case.80 
A federal-defense case exists when a party desires to engage in conduct 
that is subject to some sort of sanction, but can only test the legality of that 
                                                                                                                 
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of the 
United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights 
and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, 
whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall 
have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable 
as such. 
28 U.S.C. § 2201. It goes on to state: “Further necessary or proper relief based on a 
declaratory judgment or decree may be granted, after reasonable notice and hearing, against 
any adverse party whose rights have been determined by such judgment.” Id. § 2202. 
 77. Doernberg & Mushlin, supra note 23, at 561. In both the House and the Senate, 
discussion amounted to summaries of the Bill by its sponsors, which was voted on via voice 
vote in both chambers. 78 CONG. REC. 10564-65, 10919 (1934) (consideration of the Bill by 
the Senate); 78 CONG. REC. 8224 (1934) (consideration of the Bill by the House). 
 78. Doernberg & Mushlin, supra note 23, at 561–62. As Doernberg and Mushlin 
correctly note, “It is common for a court to rely on hearings conducted in Congresses prior 
to the session in which the statute was enacted.” Id. at 561 n.152. 
 79. Admittedly, I’m being a bit casual with my use of the word “jurisdiction.” The 
Supreme Court has specifically held that “the operation of the Declaratory Judgment Act is 
procedural only.” Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 
(1937); see also MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 138 (2007) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (noting that “[t]he Declaratory Judgment Act did not (and could not) alter the 
constitutional definition of ‘case or controversy’ or relax Article III’s command that an 
actual case or controversy exist before federal courts may adjudicate a question,” and thus 
that Aetna stood for the proposition that the statute “merely provides a different procedure 
for bringing an actual case or controversy before a federal court”). Nevertheless, numerous 
commentators have observed and argued that the Supreme Court’s “procedural only” 
insistencies frustrate congressional intent, are “neither analytically sound nor practical,” and 
may be flat-out wrong, insofar as “the Court has endorsed cases and procedures that permit 
the Act to expand federal question jurisdiction.” Doernberg & Mushlin, supra note 23, at 
532–33 (citing Herman L. Trautman, Federal Right Jurisdiction and the Declaratory 
Remedy, 7 VAND. L. REV. 445, 463 (1954); James W. Barnett, Note, Federal Question 
Jurisdiction and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 55 KY. L.J. 150 (1966); Frank M. Gilliland, 
Jr., Note, Federal Question Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and the Declaratory Judgment 
Act, 4 VAND. L. REV. 827 (1951)). 
 80. Doernberg & Mushlin, supra note 23, at 563–64. 
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sanction by engaging in the conduct, subjecting himself to prosecution, and 
then raising the issue as a defense.
81
 Professor Borchard testified that a 
declaratory judgment offered the obvious advantage of allowing an actor to 
test the validity of a law without having to “violate it, or purport to violate 
it, in order to get a decision.”82 “Thus, Congress clearly knew that the 
declaratory judgment procedure allowed an action to assert a federal 
defense to an anticipated action by the opposing party.”83 
More common—and, particularly in the context of this Article, more 
important—is the mirror-image action.84 In these cases, two parties are 
locked in a dispute, but the “injured” party—that is, the party who would 
normally be entitled to bring a civil suit—for whatever reason chooses not 
to do so.
85
 These types of scenarios are particularly prevalent in federal 
patent, trademark, and copyright cases.
86
 As Professor Sunderland testified: 
I assert that I have a right to use a certain patent. You claim that 
you have a patent. What am I going to do about it? There is no 
way that I can litigate my right, which I claim, to use that device, 
except by going ahead and using it, and you [the patent holder] 
can sit back as long as you please and let me run up just as high 
a bill of damages as you wish to have me run up, and then you 
may sue me for the damages, and I am ruined, having acted all 
the time in good faith and on my best judgment, but having no 
way in the world to find out whether I had a right to use that 
device or not.
87
 
Professor Borchard called this type of declaratory judgment a “negative 
declaration.”88 
This alteration of the “forensic position of the litigants”89 was not only 
revolutionary,
90
 it was precisely what Congress desired to offer through the 
                                                                                                                 
 81. Id. at 564–65. 
 82. Id. at 565 (quoting Hearings on H.R. 5623 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 70th Cong. 19 (1928) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 5623]). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 564. 
 85. Id. at 553. 
 86. Id. at 564. 
 87. Hearings on H.R. 5623, supra note 82, at 35. 
 88. Borchard, Part I, supra note 36, at 8. 
 89. EDWIN BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 233 (2d ed. 1941). 
 90. Professor Herman Trautman called the role-reversal “the most striking feature[] of 
the declaratory remedy.” Trautman, supra note 79, at 463. 
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creation of the declaratory judgment remedy.
91
 But one side effect of the 
mirror-image case, which went totally undiscussed during congressional 
hearings, is its potential to be abused by litigants seeking to gain strategic 
advantages in the litigation.
92
 And that abuse—or, at least, fear of abuse—is 
the focus of the remainder of this Article. 
III. Let’s Race!: How Courts Have Tried to Deal 
with the “Problem” of Anticipatory Litigation 
Here’s a common scenario: A company (oh, let’s call it “Infinity 42”) 
decides to make and sell a product (for sake of the example, let’s say, 
clothing).
93
 It designs, manufacturers, and begins to market the clothing, 
and it quickly realizes financial success.
94
 But before long, another clothing 
company (let’s call it “Tooshi”) gets wind of the sales and believes 
Infinity’s designs are copies of Tooshi’s.95 Tooshi issues what is commonly 
known as a cease-and-desist letter—a written, formal demand that one 
discontinue a particular course of conduct or else be sued—alleging 
infringement of Tooshi’s copyrighted works and trademarks.96 
What’s Infinity 42 to do? Generally speaking, it has three choices: (1) it 
could comply with the letter and cease whatever behavior it’s been asked to 
stop, which will presumably allow it to avoid costly litigation; (2) it could 
continue its conduct and effectively ignore the letter’s demands, which will 
likely prompt Tooshi to follow through on its threat of a lawsuit; or (3) it 
could, under the Declaratory Judgment Act, take the offensive and file its 
own lawsuit, asking a court for a declaration that its clothing does not 
infringe Tooshi’s intellectual property.97 Assuming Infinity 42 is not 
inclined to opt for the first choice (ceasing its conduct), litigation is nearly 
                                                                                                                 
 91. Doernberg & Mushlin, supra note 23, at 565. “[Witness discussion of the mirror-
image case] shows Congress meant to extend jurisdiction beyond limitations subsequently 
imposed by the Court.” Id. at 564. 
 92. John W. Lilley III, Preemptive Federal Declaratory Judgment Actions: Beating the 
Other Side to the Courthouse, 72 TEX. B.J. 186, 187 (2009). 
 93. See Maria Bobila, Forever 21 Claps Back at Gucci over Cease-and-Desists 
Involving Stripes [Updated], FASHONISTA (June 28, 2017), https://fashionista.com/2017/06/ 
gucci-forever-21-stripes-lawsuit. 
 94. See id. 
 95. See id. 
 96. See id. 
 97. See Barbara Thau, Gucci Versus Forever 21: Legal Fashion Experts Disagree on 
Alleged “Knockoff” Drama, FORBES (July 11, 2017, 11:12 AM), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/barbarathau/2017/07/11/gucci-versus-forever-21-legal-fashion-experts-disagree-on-
alleged-knockoff-drama/#27d9ed436e78. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss4/2
2018]       SHOOT FIRST, LITIGATE LATER 807 
 
 
certain.
98
 As Infinity 42 begins to look ahead toward that reality, it 
wonders: Where will this lawsuit take place?
99
 Here at home? Or thousands 
of miles away? 
Choosing where to litigate a particular civil lawsuit is no trivial matter.
100
 
Aside from legal disparities like variations in substantive or procedural law, 
differing venues present a host of non-legal variables that can and do affect 
litigation outcomes—things like the demographics of judges and jurors, the 
speed (or lack thereof) of disposition, the parties’ and counsel’s reputation 
in the community, and counsel’s familiarity with a particular judge’s 
preferences, just to name a few.
101
 
Let’s say Infinity 42 is headquartered in Los Angeles, California.102 It 
employs hundreds of people there and has a palpable effect on the local 
economy.
103
 It sells its clothing nation- and worldwide, and thus 
presumably would be prone to a suit just about anywhere.
104
 Undoubtedly, 
though, it would prefer to litigate on its home turf in California, where 
jurors may recognize it as a valued member of the local community.
105
 So it 
shouldn’t be surprising that the availability of a declaratory judgment can 
create, in many cases, a race to the courthouse whenever a defendant smells 
                                                                                                                 
 98. See id. 
 99. See Michael Cavendish, Understanding the First-to-File Rule and Its Anticipatory 
Suit Exception, 75 FLA. B.J. 24, 24 (2001). 
 100. See id. 
 101. See id. Perhaps the best example in recent times is the prevalence of patent suits 
filed in the Eastern District of Texas, “a largely rural federal court district that has somehow 
attracted a huge volume of high-tech patent litigation.” Daniel Nazer & Vera Ranieri, Why 
Do Patent Trolls Go to Texas? It’s Not for the BBQ, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (July 9, 
2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/07/why-do-patent-trolls-go-texas-its-not-bbq. 
Prior to 2017, nearly one in four patent plaintiffs filed their suits there, mostly due to the 
district’s “rocket docket” approach that arguably puts pressure on defendants to settle. Id.; 
Jesse Greenspan, “Rocket Dockets” Gaining on Popular E. Texas Court, LAW360 (Feb. 7, 
2008, 12:00 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/46485; Loren Steffy, Patently Unfair, 
TEX. MONTHLY (Oct. 2014), http://www.texasmonthly.com/politics/patently-unfair/. That 
will no doubt change on account of the Supreme Court’s May 2017 opinion in TC Heartland 
LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017). Dennis Crouch, Supreme 
Court Reins in Patent Venue, PATENTLY-O (May 22, 2017), https://patentlyo.com/patent/ 
2017/05/supreme-court-reins-patent.html. 
 102. See Adolfo Flores, Forever 21 Opens New L.A. Headquarters Amid Expansion 
Plans, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/14/business/la-fi-
mo-forever-21-headquarters-20121114. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See id.; Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121–24 (2014). 
 105. See Bobila, supra note 93. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
808 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:793 
 
 
a whiff of potential litigation.
106
 The reason? The “first-to-file” rule.107 A 
canon rooted in federal comity, the first-to-file rule rewards the party who 
wins the race with the spoils of home-field advantage.
108
 Simply put, the 
rule more or less directs a court to transfer, stay, or dismiss a case when a 
similar action has already been filed in another court.
109
 
A. Operation of the First-to-File Rule 
The Supreme Court first recognized the first-to-file rule in 1824:
110
 
“Admitting, then, the concurrent jurisdiction of the Courts of equity and 
law, in matters of fraud, we think the cause must be decided by the tribunal 
which first obtains possession of it, and that each Court must respect the 
judgment or decree of the other.”111 This makes perfect sense, of course. 
Imagine the implications of a typical mirror-image copyright suit, where 
Party A sues Party B for infringement in one venue, and Party B sues Party 
A for a declaration of non-infringement in another.
112
 If both courts were to 
simultaneously hear their respective cases—which involve the very same 
parties and very same issues—and come to different conclusions (for 
example, Party B is judged to have infringed in one case, but not in the 
second), how could any judgment be enforced?
113
 
As the example makes clear, the first-to-file rule serves incredibly 
important policy goals.
114
 The most frequently stated goal is comity, which 
requires federal district courts “to exercise care to avoid interference with 
each other’s affairs.”115 Another goal is efficiency and the avoidance of 
                                                                                                                 
 106. See Guthy-Renker Fitness, L.L.C. v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 179 F.R.D. 264, 
271 (C.D. Cal. 1998); Lilley, supra note 92, at 187. 
 107. D. Peter Harvey & Seth I. Appel, The Declaratory Judgment Response to a Cease 
And Desist Letter: “First-to-File” or “Procedural Fencing”?, 96 TRADEMARK REP. 639, 
640 (2006). 
 108. Cavendish, supra note 99, at 24. 
 109. Alltrade, Inc. v. Uniweld Prods., Inc., 946 F.2d 622, 623 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 110. Michael A. Cicero, First-to-File and Choice-of-Forum Roots Run Too Deep for 
Micron to Curb Most Races to the Courthouse, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 547, 
550 (2008). 
 111. Smith v. M’Iver, 22 U.S. 532, 536 (1824). 
 112. See Hill, supra note 22, at 247. 
 113. See id. at 245–46. 
 114. Julie Vanneman, Note, Procedural Fencing in Retiree Benefits Disputes: 
Applications of the First-Filed Rule in Federal Courts, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 123, 130 (2007). 
 115. W. Gulf Mar. Ass’n v. ILA Deep Sea Local 24, 751 F.2d 721, 728 (5th Cir. 1985). 
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duplicative litigation.
116
 Yet another is the avoidance of “piecemeal 
resolution of issues that call for a uniform result.”117 
The Ninth Circuit has articulated one of the most frequently cited first-
to-file-rule tests, presumably due to its simplicity and 
straightforwardness.
118
 It employs three factors: “(1) the chronology of the 
two actions; (2) the similarity of the parties; and (3) the similarity of the 
issues.”119 The latter two factors don’t necessarily require exact matches, 
but there should be significant—if not nearly identical—overlap.120 
Assuming that the doctrine is invoked by establishing a first-filed case 
that involves the same parties and issues, a court will typically invoke a 
presumption in favor of the first-to-file rule.
121
 As the Ninth Circuit has 
observed, the rule “should not be disregarded lightly”122 unless (1) the 
balance of convenience strongly favors the forum of the second-filed 
case;
123
 or (2) there are special or compelling circumstances that justify 
                                                                                                                 
 116. Crosley Corp. v. Hazeltine Corp., 122 F.2d 925, 930 (3d Cir. 1941) (“The economic 
waste involved in duplicating litigation is obvious. Equally important is its adverse effect 
upon the prompt and efficient administration of justice. . . . [P]ublic policy requires us to 
seek actively to avoid the waste of judicial time and energy. Courts already heavily burdened 
with litigation with which they must of necessity deal should therefore not be called upon to 
duplicate each other’s work in cases involving the same issues and the same parties.”). 
 117. W. Gulf Mar. Ass’n, 751 F.2d at 729. 
 118. See, e.g., Plating Resources, Inc. v. UTI Corp., 47 F. Supp. 2d 899, 903 (N.D. Ohio 
1999) (“In deciding whether the first-to-file rule warrants transferring this case, the Court 
finds the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Alltrade to be instructive.”). 
 119. Guthy-Renker Fitness, L.L.C. v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 179 F.R.D. 264, 270 
(C.D. Cal. 1998) (citing Alltrade, Inc. v. Uniweld Prods., Inc., 946 F.2d 622, 625–26 (9th 
Cir. 1991)). 
 120. Cadle Co. v. Whataburger of Alice, Inc., 174 F.3d 599, 603 (5th Cir. 1999); Plating 
Resources, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 904; EBW, Inc. v. Environ Prods., Inc., No. 1:96–CV–144, 
1996 WL 550020, at *3 (W.D. Mich. July 8, 1996). 
 121. See, e.g., Terra Int’l, Inc. v. Miss. Chem. Corp., 922 F. Supp. 1334, 1353 n.13 
(“[T]he rule is more than a ‘starting place’ for the analysis, but instead states a rebuttable 
presumption that the first-filed suit should have priority.”). But see Tempco Elec. Heater 
Corp. v. Omega Eng’g, Inc., 819 F.2d 746, 750 (7th Cir. 1987) (“This circuit has never 
adhered to a rigid ‘first to file’ rule. . . . Although a ‘first to file’ rule would have the virtue 
of certainty and ease of application . . . the cost—a rule which will encourage an unseemly 
race to the courthouse and, quite likely, numerous unnecessary suits—is simply too high.”) 
 122. Church of Scientology of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 611 F.2d 738, 750 (9th 
Cir. 1979), overruled on other grounds by Animal Legal Def. Fund v. U.S. Food & Drug 
Admin., 836 F.3d 987, 990 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 123. James P. George, Parallel Litigation, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 769, 786 (1999). The 
“balance of convenience” analysis resembles an inconvenient forum challenge under 28 
U.S.C. § 1404(a). Id. at 787 (citing 800-Flowers, Inc. v. Intercontinental Florists, Inc., 860 F. 
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dismissing, enjoining, or transferring the first action, or perhaps allowing 
both to be litigated.
124
 Varying applications of the “compelling 
circumstances” exception125—the wellspring of the anticipatory suit 
exception—is what leads to such inconsistent results. 
Much of the blame for the confusion can be traced back to the Supreme 
Court.
126
 In the case of Kerotest Manufacturing Co. v. C-O-Two Fire 
Equipment Co., the Court lamented that “[t]he Federal Declaratory 
Judgments Act, facilitating as it does the initiation of litigation by different 
parties to many-sided transactions, has created complicated problems for 
coordinate courts.”127 It suggested that “wise judicial administration” may 
militate against a “rigid mechanical” application of the first-to-file rule, and 
ultimately left lower courts with this warning: “The manufacturer who is 
charged with infringing a patent cannot stretch the Federal Declaratory 
Judgments Act to give him a paramount right to choose the forum for trying 
out questions of infringement and validity. He is given an equal start in the 
race to the courthouse, not a headstart.”128 
                                                                                                                 
Supp. 128, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Igloo Prods. Corp. v. Mounties, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 214, 
218 (S.D. Tex. 1990)). 
 124. George, supra note 123, at 786–87. 
 125. Professor George identifies at least eleven instances that could constitute a 
compelling circumstance: 
 (1) the similarity of the claims, though perfect identity is not required; 
 (2) the relative progress of the two cases; 
 (3) the existence of a forum selection clause; 
 (4) a plaintiff’s need to litigate that claim individually rather than join a 
class; 
 (5) the need to consolidate related actions; 
 (6) multidistrict litigation transfer for pretrial purposes; 
 (7) lack of notice of the first-filed claim; 
 (8) having jurisdiction over necessary or desirable parties; 
 (9) discouragement of forum shopping; 
 (10) the bad faith filing of a declaratory judgment action; and 
 (11) ‘state interest’ of the second forum. 
Id. at 787–88 (footnotes omitted). Although he does not mention the “anticipatory filing” 
exception by name, it would seem to fall under either the forum shopping justification, the 
bad faith justification, or both. See, e.g., 909 Corp. v. Vill. of Bolingbrook Police Pension 
Fund, 741 F. Supp. 1290, 1292–93 (S.D. Tex. 1990) (holding that the court “cannot allow a 
party to secure a more favorable forum by filing an action for declaratory judgment when it 
has notice that the other party intends to file suit involving the same issues in a different 
forum,” as doing so would provoke a disorderly race to the courthouse).  
 126. See Cicero, supra note 110, at 552–54. 
 127. 342 U.S. 180, 184 (1952) (footnotes omitted). 
 128. Id. at 184-85. 
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B. Where Two Roads Meet: Discretion Under the Declaratory Judgment 
Act and the First-to-File Rule 
Despite mirror-image actions being one of the types of cases Congress 
intended to authorize through the Declaratory Judgment Act, some courts—
in the mold of the Supreme Court’s Kerotest opinion—have held that 
“[w]hen a declaratory judgment action is the first-filed case . . . the situation 
raises a ‘red flag’ and could reveal compelling circumstances. . . . This is 
because a declaratory judgment action ‘may be more indicative of a 
preemptive strike than a suit for damages or equitable relief.’”129 The idea, 
in short, is that a declaratory plaintiff is somehow abusing the statute when 
it files its own claim while at the same time knowing with some certainty 
that the defendant—or, really, the natural plaintiff—intends on filing suit.130 
As the D.C. Circuit has written: 
Certainly one of the most common and indisputably appropriate 
uses of the declaratory judgment procedure is to enable one who 
has been charged with patent infringement to secure a binding 
determination of whether proposed conduct will infringe a patent 
in question without waiting until he becomes the defendant in an 
actual infringement suit. The purpose of granting declaratory 
relief to one potentially liable for infringement is to allow him to 
know in advance whether he may legally pursue a particular 
course of conduct. . . . [But the Plaintiff in this case] is instead in 
the position of one who desires an anticipatory adjudication, at 
the time and place of its choice, of the validity of the defenses it 
expects to raise against patent-related claims it expects to be 
pressed against it. The anticipation of defenses is not ordinarily a 
proper use of the declaratory judgment procedure. It deprives 
the plaintiff of his traditional choice of forum and timing, and it 
provokes a disorderly race to the courthouse. Thus, as an initial 
                                                                                                                 
 129. See, e.g., Commercial Union Ins. Cos. v. Torbaty, 955 F. Supp. 1162, 1163 (E.D. 
Mo. 1997) (quoting Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 989 F.2d 1002, 1007 (8th Cir. 
1993)). 
 130. See, e.g., Cunningham Bros., Inc. v. Bail, 407 F.2d 1165, 1167–68 (7th Cir. 1969) 
(“[T]o compel potential personal injury plaintiffs to litigate their claims at a time and in a 
forum chosen by the alleged tort-feasor would be a perversion of the Declaratory Judgment 
Act.”). “The primary purpose of that Act is ‘to avoid accrual of avoidable damages to one 
not certain of his rights and to afford him an early adjudication without waiting until his 
adversary should see fit to begin suit, after damage had accrued.’” Id. (quoting E. Edelmann 
& Co. v. Triple-A Specialty Co., 88 F.2d 852, 854 (7th Cir. 1937) (other citations omitted)). 
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matter, we would be skeptical that a declaratory judgment action 
relating to an expired patent should be entertained.
131
 
Although the Declaratory Judgment Act authorized the bringing of an 
entirely new type of lawsuit, it was nearly universally understood from the 
beginning that the statute did not require a federal court to assume 
jurisdiction over such a case.
132
 By saying “any court of the United States, 
upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other 
legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration,” Congress 
left whether to hear the suit to the discretion of the court.
133
 As the Supreme 
Court has noted, “[w]e have repeatedly characterized the Declaratory 
Judgment Act as ‘an enabling Act, which confers a discretion on the courts 
rather than an absolute right upon the litigant.’”134 
If there was ever any doubt about the courts’ power to decline to hear 
declaratory judgment cases, the Supreme Court disabused us of that notion 
in Wilton v. Seven Falls Co.
135
 There, the declaratory plaintiffs argued that 
two other Supreme Court cases—Colorado River Water Conservation 
District v. United States
136
 and Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. 
Mercury Construction Corp.
137—stood for the proposition that the 
discretionary language in the statue only meant that a district court wasn’t 
required to grant the relief the declaratory plaintiff sought.
138
 “District 
courts must hear declaratory judgment cases absent exceptional 
circumstances; district courts may decline to enter the requested relief 
                                                                                                                 
 131. Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585, 592–93 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted), superseded by statute, Act of Aug. 27, 1982, Pub. L. No. 96-247, 96 Stat. 
317 (codified as amended in 35 U.S.C. § 294 (2012)), as recognized in Nat’l R.R. Passenger 
Corp. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 892 F.2d 1066, 1072 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 132. Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286 (1995); Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of 
Am., 316 U.S. 491, 494 (1942)); BORCHARD, supra note 89, at 312–14; Edwin Borchard, 
Discretion to Refuse Jurisdiction of Actions for Declaratory Judgments, 26 MINN. L. REV. 
677, 678 (1942). 
 133. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2012) (emphasis added); Wilton, 515 U.S. at 286; Brillhart, 316 
U.S. at 494. “Although the District Court had jurisdiction of the suit under the Federal 
Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 400, it was under no compulsion to exercise that 
jurisdiction. The petitioner’s motion to dismiss the bill was addressed to the discretion of the 
court.” Id. (citations omitted). 
 134. Wilton, 515 U.S. at 287 (quoting Public Serv. Comm’n of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 
U.S. 237, 241 (1952)). 
 135. Id. 
 136. 424 U.S. 800 (1976). 
 137. 460 U.S. 1 (1983). 
 138. Wilton, 515 U.S. at 287. 
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following a full trial on the merits, if no beneficial purpose is thereby 
served or if equity otherwise counsels,” the Petitioners argued.139 
The Supreme Court, predictably, rejected that approach:  
[The Plaintiffs’] argument depends on the untenable proposition 
that a district court, knowing at the commencement of litigation 
that it will exercise its broad statutory discretion to decline 
declaratory relief, must nonetheless go through the futile 
exercise of hearing a case on the merits first. Nothing in the 
language of the Declaratory Judgment Act recommends [the 
Plaintiffs’] reading, and we are unwilling to impute to Congress 
an intention to require such a wasteful expenditure of judicial 
resources. If a district court, in the sound exercise of its 
judgment, determines after a complaint is filed that a declaratory 
judgment will serve no useful purpose, it cannot be incumbent 
upon that court to proceed to the merits before staying or 
dismissing the action.
140
 
Rather, the Court reaffirmed that “Congress sought to place a remedial 
arrow in the district court’s quiver; it created an opportunity, rather than a 
duty, to grant a new form of relief to qualifying litigants.”141 And although 
it framed that “opportunity” in terms of discretion, the Court hasn’t done 
much to define the bounds of that discretion.
142
 In Brillhart v. Excess 
Insurance Co. of America—a federal declaratory judgment case concerning 
claims that were also pending in a state court case—the Court opined that a 
district judge “should ascertain whether the questions in controversy 
between the parties to the federal suit, and which are not foreclosed under 
the applicable substantive law, can better be settled in the proceeding 
pending in the state court.”143 But beyond that, the Court declined to go 
much further: “We do not now attempt a comprehensive enumeration of 
                                                                                                                 
 139. Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 22). 
 140. Id. at 287–88. 
 141. Id. at 288. 
 142. See Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491, 494–95 (1942). 
 143. Id. at 495. 
This may entail inquiry into the scope of the pending state court proceeding and 
the nature of defenses open there. The federal court may have to consider 
whether the claims of all parties in interest can satisfactorily be adjudicated in 
that proceeding, whether necessary parties have been joined, whether such 
parties are amenable to process in that proceeding, etc. 
Id. 
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what in other cases may be revealed as relevant factors governing the 
exercise of a district court’s discretion.”144 
Nor has the Supreme Court since Brillhart offered a specific list of 
factors for lower courts to employ in exercising their discretion. Instead, it 
has merely referred to “considerations of practicality and wise judicial 
administration.”145 Consequently, it has fallen to the circuit courts to 
establish the contours of federal courts’ discretion to hear declaratory 
judgment actions.
146
 Almost uniformly, the circuits have employed that 
discretion to target declaratory judgment actions they see as improper 
attempts to gain a litigation advantage.
147
 This targeting, taken together 
with courts’ inherent discretion to disregard the first-to-file rule in 
“compelling circumstances,”148 has resulted in a dangerously loose general 
framework to guide the discretionary hearing of declaratory judgment 
actions. 
C. A Case Study: The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
Most of the U.S. Courts of Appeals have identified tests to help 
themselves and lower courts exercise their Declaratory Judgment Act 
discretion.
149
 Some of those tests are specifically enumerated lists, while 
                                                                                                                 
 144. Id. 
 145. Wilton, 515 U.S. at 288. 
 146. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mhoon, 31 F.3d 979, 983 (10th Cir. 1994) 
(identifying factors trial courts should examine in exercising their discretion). 
The Supreme Court has long made clear that the Declaratory Judgment Act 
“gave the federal courts competence to make a declaration of rights; it did not 
impose a duty to do so.” This circuit has provided trial courts in its bailiwick 
with substantial guidance on this score, instructing them to weigh two questions 
originally supplied by Professor Borchard: Will a declaration of rights, under 
the circumstances, serve to clarify or settle legal relations in issue? Will it 
terminate or afford relief from the uncertainty giving rise to the proceeding? If 
an affirmative answer can be had to both questions, the trial court should hear 
the case; if not, it should decline to do so. As noted approvingly by this 
court . . . however, the Sixth Circuit has recently suggested that a trial judge 
should weigh an expanded list of factors when deciding whether or not to hear 
a declaratory action. 
Id. at 983–84 (citations omitted). 
 147. See Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Holmes Cty., 343 F.3d 383, 390 n.2 (5th Cir. 2003). 
“Every circuit has a similar test, although expressed in different terms.” Id. at 390. 
 148. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Haydu, 675 F.2d 1169, 1174 (11th 
Cir. 1982) (“In absence of compelling circumstances, the court initially seized of a 
controversy should be the one to decide the case.”) (citing Mann Mfg., Inc. v. Hortex, Inc., 
439 F.2d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 1971)). 
 149. See Sherwin-Williams, 343 F.3d at 390. 
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others are more broad policy statements.
150
 Regardless of differences in 
form, all of the circuits have singled out procedural fencing or improper 
forum selection as a ground upon which jurisdiction may be denied.
151
 
The Fifth Circuit’s test152 and related jurisprudence are illustrative for 
two reasons. First, the Fifth Circuit has a well-developed history of 
discussing the bounds of its declaratory discretion. Second, and more 
importantly, the court’s plethora of caselaw best illustrates the 
schizophrenic approach that is so problematic: while it stands out among 
the circuits as one that attempts to distinguish harmless forum shopping 
from the more injurious type, it nevertheless contributes to lower courts’ 
uncertainty by promulgating a set of factors that, by their own language, 
encourage judges to dismiss cases.
153
  
In that sense, the Fifth Circuit is perhaps the best example of a judicial 
circuit that has so outrageously muddied the declaratory judgment waters 
that it’s nearly impossible to determine what will sink and what will swim. 
On one hand, the court has appropriately warned that “[i]n the exercise of 
their sound discretion to entertain declaratory actions the district courts may 
not decline on the basis of whim or personal disinclination.”154 On the other 
hand, in an attempt to give structure to the analysis,
155
 the court has 
gradually given birth to an unwieldy seven-factor test that even the court 
now admits should not be literally applied.
156
 
 The test began to take shape in 1981 in Hollis v. Itawamba County 
Loans, where the court suggested looking to “whether there is a pending 
procedure in state court in which the matters in controversy between the 
                                                                                                                 
 150. Compare Tempco Elec. Heater Corp. v. Omega Eng’g, Inc., 819 F.2d 746, 747–50 
(noting that “[t]he issue we must determine is whether that discretion which the district court 
retained to decline to hear Tempco’s declaratory judgment suit was properly exercised in 
this case” without identifying a list factors to consider), with United Capitol Ins. Co. v. 
Kapiloff, 155 F.3d 488, 493–94 (1998) (“To aid district courts in balancing the state and 
federal interests when a parallel state action is pending, we have articulated four factors for 
consideration.”). 
 151. See Hipage Co., Inc. v. Access2Go, 589 F. Supp. 2d 602, 616 (E.D. Va. 2008) (“It is 
well established that courts disfavor ‘procedural fencing,’ such as forum shopping and races 
to the courthouse.”). 
 152. Sherwin-Williams, 343 F.3d at 390–92. 
 153. See id. 
 154. Hollis v. Itawamba Cty. Loans, 657 F.2d 746, 750 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 155. Id. Trial courts “may take into consideration the speculativeness of the situation 
before them and the adequacy of the record for the determination they are called upon to 
make, as well as other factors.” Id. 
 156. Sherwin-Williams, 343 F.3d at 388 (“[The anticipation-of-litigation] Trejo labels 
cannot be literally applied.”). 
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parties may be fully litigated.”157 Two years later, the court began to give 
more flesh to its test, noting in Mission Insurance Co. v. Puritan Fashions 
Corp. that a trial court can “take into account a wide variety of factors.”158 
Aside from the “pending state-court procedure” consideration, it also 
encouraged judges to examine the interests of judicial economy as they 
relate to the “convenience of parties and witnesses.”159 Perhaps more 
importantly, the Fifth Circuit held that the trial court had acted 
appropriately when it considered “the inequity of permitting [the Plaintiff] 
to gain precedence in time and forum by its conduct.”160 It cited to one of its 
cases from 1967, in which it affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of a 
declaratory judgment action filed by a plaintiff in Texas after it had been 
threatened with a lawsuit elsewhere.
161
 In equating that case to the facts 
before it, the court held that “[t]here is sufficient evidence here to support 
the district court’s conclusion that [the Plaintiff’s] action was in anticipation 
of [the Defendant’s] California suit.”162 
So, at that point, while the Fifth Circuit had not set forth its factors in 
any numerical list, it would be fair to assume that the test effectively 
consisted of three concerns: (1) the existence of a pending state court case; 
(2) convenience of the parties and witnesses; and (3) the inequities of 
permitting the plaintiff to gain precedence in time and forum.
163
 
Six years later, in Rowan Companies, Inc. v. Griffin, the Fifth Circuit 
essentially said just that (again, albeit, without numerically designating its 
list); the court, however, also did something fairly interesting.
164
 Rather 
                                                                                                                 
 157. 657 F.2d at 750. 
 158. 706 F.2d 599, 601 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 159. Id. at 602–03. As to the convenience of the parties consideration, the court 
explained: 
The classic formulation of these considerations, although in a forum non 
conveniens and not a declaratory judgment context, is contained in Gulf Oil 
Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508, 67 S. Ct. 839, 843, 91 L. Ed. 1055 (1947): 
“An interest to be considered, and the one likely to be most pressed, is the 
private interest of the litigant. Important considerations are the relative ease of 
access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of 
unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility 
of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other 
practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” 
Id. at 602–03.  
 160. Id. at 602 (emphasis added). 
 161. See Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. Marshall, 381 F.2d 661, 662 (5th Cir. 1967).  
 162. Mission Ins., 706 F.2d at 602. 
 163. See id. 
 164. 876 F.2d 26, 29 (5th Cir. 1989).  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss4/2
2018]       SHOOT FIRST, LITIGATE LATER 817 
 
 
than discuss the third factor as one and refer to it as “improper anticipatory 
filing,” “forum shopping,” or something similar, it duplicated the factor, 
effectively creating a four-factor test: 
For example, declaratory judgment relief may be denied because 
of a pending state court proceeding in which the matters in 
controversy between the parties may be fully litigated, because 
the declaratory complaint was filed in anticipation of another 
suit and is being used for the purpose of forum shopping, . . . 
because of possible inequities in permitting the plaintiff to gain 
precedence in time and forum, or because of inconvenience to 
the parties or the witnesses.
165
 
Then, four years later, in Travelers Insurance Co. v. Louisiana Farm 
Bureau Federation, Inc., the court again articulated its discretionary test, 
this time enumerating its factors.
166
 The test didn’t change in any 
substantive way, but what were four factors in Rowan suddenly ballooned 
to six.
167
 The court created the additional factors by separating the judicial 
economy and convenience of witnesses concern into two separate factors,
168
 
and by again splintering the anticipatory litigation exception, this time into 
three separate factors: “2) whether the plaintiff filed suit in anticipation of a 
lawsuit filed by the defendant, 3) whether the plaintiff engaged in forum 
shopping in bringing the suit . . . 4) whether possible inequities in allowing 
the declaratory plaintiff to gain precedence in time or to change forums 
exist.”169 The court made no effort to explain how those three differed in 
any real way.
170
 
One year later, in St. Paul Insurance Co. v. Trejo, the Fifth Circuit added 
a seventh factor: “whether the federal court is being called on to construe a 
state judicial decree involving the same parties and entered by the court 
before whom the parallel state suit between the same parties is pending.”171 
                                                                                                                 
 165. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 166. 996 F.2d 774, 778 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. “The relevant factors which the district court must consider include, but are not 
limited to . . . 5) whether the federal court is a convenient forum for the parties and 
witnesses, and 6) whether retaining the lawsuit in federal court would serve the purposes of 
judicial economy.” Id. (citations omitted). 
 169. Id. (citations omitted). 
 170. Id. 
 171. 39 F.3d 585, 591 (5th Cir. 1994). “For example, here the district court should 
determine whether it makes more sense for the state court that approved the First Settlement 
to interpret it.” Id. at 591 n.8.  
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Again, it failed to offer much explanation as to why the addition was 
necessary given the already existing “pending state court proceeding” 
factor.
172
 Perhaps because this was the case in which the court finalized the 
seven-factor test, the test in the Fifth Circuit is now known colloquially as 
the “Trejo factors.”173 
A year after Trejo, the Fifth Circuit made a noble effort at fully 
analyzing the mess of factors it had gradually assembled. In Sherwin-
Williams Co. v. Holmes County, the court spent most of its opinion 
explaining how a court should go about applying the seven factors.
174
 It did 
so by breaking down the list of seven into three overall concerns: “the 
proper allocation of decision-making between state and federal courts,” 
fairness, and efficiency.
175
 The Trejo test’s first and seventh factors go to 
the state/federal court dichotomy concern, the second, third, and fourth 
factors go to fairness, and the fifth and sixth factors go to efficiency.
176
 
In discussing the “fairness” concerns, the Fifth Circuit pointed out that 
all of the circuit courts are worried about plaintiffs using the Declaratory 
Judgment Act to “forum shop,” but—to its credit—admitted that the actual 
question isn’t as easy as it sounds: 
Although many federal courts use terms such as “forum 
selection” and “anticipatory filing” to describe reasons for 
dismissing a federal declaratory judgment action in favor of 
related state court litigation, these terms are shorthand for more 
complex inquiries. The filing of every lawsuit requires forum 
selection. Federal declaratory judgment suits are routinely filed 
                                                                                                                 
 172. See id. at 590. Although I suspect most would agree such a concern would be 
fairly—even if not literally—subsumed by the “pending state court proceeding” factor, 
apparently the court did not believe as much at the time. But nine years later, in Sherwin-
Williams Co. v. Holmes County, the court admitted that both factors implicate the same 
comity concerns. 343 F.3d 383, 391 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 173. See, e.g., Nat’l Cas. Co. v. Gonzalez, 637 F. App’x 812, 817 (5th Cir. 2016) 
(“While, on this record, assessment of most of the Trejo factors would be guesswork . . . .”); 
AXA Re Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Day, 162 F. App’x 316, 320 (5th Cir. 2006) (“The 
district court considered all of the Trejo factors.”); Vulcan Materials Co. v. City of 
Tehuacana, 238 F.3d 382, 390 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Trejo confirmed and restated the test for the 
discretionary dismissal of declaratory judgment actions set forth in Travelers Ins. Co. v. 
Louisiana Farm Bureau Fed’n, 996 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1993). The seven Trejo factors that 
must be considered on the record before a discretionary, nonmerits dismissal of a 
declaratory judgment action occurs are: . . . .”).  
 174. Sherwin-Williams, 343 F.3d at 390–91. 
 175. Id.  
 176. Id. at 391-92. 
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in anticipation of other litigation. The courts use pejorative terms 
such as “forum shopping” or “procedural fencing” to identify a 
narrower category of federal declaratory judgment lawsuits filed 
for reasons found improper and abusive, other than selecting a 
forum or anticipating related litigation. Merely filing a 
declaratory judgment action in a federal court with jurisdiction to 
hear it, in anticipation of state court litigation, is not in itself 
improper anticipatory litigation or otherwise abusive “forum 
shopping.”177 
In analyzing the facts before it, the Fifth Circuit rejected the notion that 
the case should have been dismissed on account of being filed 
anticipatorily.
178
 It started by admitting that its own case from twenty years 
prior, Mission, “is often cited for the proposition that a declaratory 
judgment action brought in ‘anticipation of litigation’ should be 
dismissed.”179 But it then distinguished the case from Mission, carefully 
pointing out that Mission was a declaratory judgment case brought in a 
Texas federal court before the defendant could bring its case in a California 
state court: “Because California and Texas had different choice of law 
rules, the difference in forum changed the law that applied,” which 
amounted to “improper ‘procedural fencing’ undermining ‘the wholesome 
purposes’ of declaratory actions.”180 On the contrary, in Sherwin-Williams, 
“the selection of the federal forum . . . did not change the law that would 
apply. . . . There is no evidence that Sherwin-Williams brought its 
declaratory judgment action in search of more favorable law.”181 
In a similar vein, the court dispensed with the idea that seeking a more 
favorable forum merely from the standpoint of litigation strategy was the 
type of concern that would lead to a finding of “improper forum 
shopping.”182 It took issue with the district court’s finding that the purpose 
of Sherwin-Williams’s declaratory filing was to avoid being sued in local 
“counties in which large jury verdicts are awarded,” and, conversely, was 
only seeking a federal forum “in an attempt to avoid the state court 
system.”183 The court reasoned that “[t]hose factors do not remove the 
                                                                                                                 
 177. Id. at 391. 
 178. Id. at 397. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. (quoting Mission Ins. Co. v. Puritan Fashions Corp., 706 F.2d 599, 602 (5th Cir. 
1983)). 
 181. Id. at 399. 
 182. Id. at 398–99. 
 183. Id. 
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legitimate reason, recognized by this court in Travelers, for Sherwin-
Williams’s choice of federal forum for this declaratory judgment suit.”184 
Instead, it reflected “the traditional justification for diversity jurisdiction, to 
protect out-of-state defendants.”185 
Since Sherwin-Williams, the Fifth Circuit has been consistent in its 
application of its third, fourth, and fifth factors. For instance, just a year 
after Sherwin-Williams, the court again explained its reasoning in a 
different case, American Employers’ Insurance Co. v. Eagle: 
With respect to fairness considerations, in Sherwin-Williams we 
recognized that the mere act of filing a federal declaratory action 
in anticipation of a state lawsuit is not, in and of itself, 
impermissible. Rather, we were concerned with whether there 
was a legitimate reason to be in federal court. In Sherwin-
Williams, we held that the selection of a federal forum was not 
impermissible for at least four reasons. First, a desire to avoid 
multiple lawsuits in multiple courts is a legitimate reason to want 
to be in federal court. Second, Sherwin-Williams’ desire to avoid 
plaintiff-friendly state court juries was not illegitimate, because 
Sherwin-Williams was an out-of-state company. The traditional 
justification for diversity jurisdiction is to ensure fairness for 
out-of-state litigants. Third, the selection of a federal forum 
would not change the applicable law because state law would 
apply in either case. Fourth, there was no evidence that the 
defendant in the declaratory judgment action had been restricted 
from filing a state court action prior to the plaintiff filing the 
declaratory judgment action.
186
 
The court then agreed that “Appellants did not engage in improper forum 
shopping, nor did they act unfairly with respect to Appellee by filing a 
federal declaratory judgment action.”187 
Most recently, in 2015, the court reaffirmed that the core purpose of the 
Declaratory Judgment Act is to “allow potential defendants to resolve a 
dispute without waiting to be sued or until the statute of limitations 
                                                                                                                 
 184. Id. (citing Travelers Ins. Co. v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Fed’n, 996 F.2d 774, 776–
77, 779 (5th Cir. 1993)). 
 185. Id. (citing Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 764 F.2d 1148, 1153 n.3 (5th Cir. 
1985)). 
 186. 122 F. App’x 700, 703 (5th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 187. Id. 
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expires,” and that “[t]he mere fact that a declaratory judgment action is 
brought in anticipation of other suits does not require dismissal.”188 
The problem, though, is that despite those explanations, the Trejo test is 
inherently confusing and, consequently, is being applied erratically by the 
lower courts.
189
 For instance, the second factor—“whether the plaintiff filed 
suit in anticipation of a lawsuit filed by the defendant”—makes no sense: 
the Fifth Circuit itself points out that every declaratory judgment case is 
filed in anticipation of litigation.
190
 The third factor—“whether the plaintiff 
engaged in forum shopping in bringing the suit”—effectively makes “forum 
shopping” taboo; moreover, it does so without recognizing (as the court’s 
caselaw bears out) that every case necessarily involves the choice of a 
forum, and that forum shopping can be both innocent and sinister.
191
 The 
fourth factor—“whether possible inequities exist in allowing the declaratory 
plaintiff to gain precedence in time or to change forums”—is sufficiently 
broad to give courts discretion, but suffers from the same malady as the 
third factor: there’s always inequity in any situation, but aren’t we really 
concerned only with substantive inequities?
192
 Compounding the individual 
shortcomings of factors two, three, and four, the court makes no effort to 
explain how any of the three factors differ from each other, which creates 
another problem: when taken together, the factors send a very clear signal 
to lower courts that they should look disapprovingly on any case that 
appears to be brought in anticipation of another.
193
 
If one needs proof, he or she need only look to district court caselaw 
from the Fifth Circuit since Sherwin-Williams. One of the two cases 
discussed in Part I—Mill Creek Press, Inc. v. The Thomas Kinkade Co.—
                                                                                                                 
 188. Ironshore Specialty Ins. Co. v. Tractor Supply Co., 624 F. App’x 159, 167 (5th Cir. 
2015) (quoting Sherwin-Williams, 343 F.3d at 397). 
 189. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cureington, No. 10–0764, 2011 WL 1085661, at 
*7–10 (W.D. La. 2011) (suggesting that the Sherwin-Williams decision’s “attempts to 
downplay the anticipatory filing and forum-shopping” ran contrary to Mission Ins. Co. v. 
Puritan Fashions Corp., 706 F.2d 599, 602 (5th Cir. 1983), and “a later panel of the Fifth 
Circuit cannot overrule an earlier panel’s decision”). 
 190. Sherwin-Williams, 343 F.3d at 391–92. 
 191. Id. at 397–99. 
 192. Id. at 391. 
 193. See, e.g., Ford v. Monsour, No. 11–1232, 2011 WL 4808173, at *2–5 (W.D. La. 
2011) (quoting Travelers Ins. Co. v. La. Farm Bureau Fed., 996 F.2d 774, 779 n. 15 (5th Cir. 
1993) (noting that “the Fifth Circuit requires ‘the court to consider whether the declaratory 
suit was filed in anticipation of a lawsuit filed by the declaratory defendant’” en route to 
dismissing the case as an improper attempt at procedural fencing). 
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came out of the Northern District of Texas.
194
 There, despite acknowledging 
Sherwin-Williams’s disapproval of the “anticipatory” and “forum shopping” 
labels, the district court nevertheless concluded that the “plaintiffs filed this 
declaratory judgment action for the improper purpose of ‘subverting the 
real plaintiff’s advantage’ by filing this suit in a forum of their choosing.”195 
Of course, the judge had his reasons, mostly focusing on the fact that the 
case was “filed during a period of ‘settlement negotiations.’”196 While it 
was true that settlement negotiations were ongoing, the Fifth Circuit has 
never said filing a declaratory judgment action even as the parties are 
negotiating amounts to bad faith. Rather, to reiterate, Sherwin-Williams 
focused on the fact that the declaratory plaintiff wasn’t trying to take 
advantage of different choice-of-law rules or other substantive differences 
that would exist between its chosen venue and that of the natural 
plaintiff.
197
 
The tests and corresponding caselaw of the other circuit courts paint a 
similar picture.
198
 So what are litigants to do? How must an alleged 
intellectual property infringer react to a cease-and-desist letter? More 
importantly, how can courts do a better job of focusing on the proper 
concerns to fully effectuate the purpose of the declaratory remedy? 
IV. How Courts Can Learn to Stop Worrying 
and Love the Anticipatory Lawsuit 
There can be no doubt that most courts express a distaste for the so-
called race to the courthouse.
199
 What’s less clear is why. Certainly, it’s no 
surprise that judges don’t want to be pawns in someone else’s game, 
particularly where one or both of the players are constantly looking for an 
unfair advantage.
200
 And, to be sure, forum selection can, in some cases, be 
used to the substantive detriment of one’s opponent.201 But as the Fifth 
                                                                                                                 
 194. Mill Creek Press, Inc. v. Thomas Kinkade Co., No. CIVA.3:04-CV-1213-G, 2004 
WL 2607987 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 2004). 
 195. Id. at *9. 
 196. Id. at *8. 
 197. See 343 F.3d at 399. 
 198. See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 219 (2nd Cir. 1978) 
(“The federal declaratory judgment is not a prize to the winner of a race to the 
courthouses.”) (quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 119 n.12 (1971)). 
 199. See generally Antony L. Ryan, Principles of Forum Selection, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 
167, 167–68 (2000). 
 200. See id. 
 201. See id. 
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Circuit has pointed out, not all attempts at forum selection are sinister or 
improper.
202
 
The key, then, is for courts to have a clear understanding of what 
constitutes improper procedural fencing as distinguished from a perfectly 
acceptable anticipatory declaratory judgment suit.
203
 As posited in the 
previous section, the Fifth Circuit has attempted to delineate for its lower 
courts what should pass muster under the Declaratory Judgment Act and 
what shouldn’t.204 The problem, however, is that most other circuits haven’t 
done the same; moreover, even within the Fifth Circuit, district courts have 
ignored the guidance or misapplied it, likely due in large part to its poor 
drafting.
205
 
To avoid the itchy trigger fingers of the district courts, the circuit courts 
should adopt a uniform understanding of improper forum selection and 
procedural fencing that ignores the idea of a race to the courthouse. In 
short, the proposition that the natural plaintiff has in some way been robbed 
of its rights when the defendant files first is misguided and conflicts with 
the purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act. 
A. An Unnatural Affinity for the Natural Plaintiff 
When it comes to a strict application of the anticipatory suit exception, 
courts typically say the same thing—something along the lines of it being 
improper to “wrest[] the choice of forum from the ‘natural’ plaintiff.”206 
That necessarily begs the question: Where does this idea of the natural 
plaintiff come from? 
The Supreme Court has never used the term; it appears to have made its 
first appearance in 1987 in the Seventh Circuit case Employers Insurance of 
Wausau v. Shell Oil Co.: 
Worse, since declaratory judgments often reverse the positions 
of plaintiff and defendant, we must decide how the claim would 
have been classified in 1891 had the parties been on the “right” 
side. This is implicit in the requirement that we ascertain what 
kind of suit could have been brought. . . . All of this produces a 
conundrum. Who would have been the “natural” plaintiff, and 
                                                                                                                 
 202. Sherwin-Williams, 343 F.3d at 391–92. 
 203. See id. 
 204. See supra Section III.C. 
 205. See supra Section III.C. 
 206. See, e.g., Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 431 (7th Cir. 
1993) (invoking the idea that in declaratory judgment actions, the defendant is actually the 
“natural plaintiff”). 
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what kind of relief would he have sought, in an action no one 
could have filed in 1891?
207
 
The label is now commonly used to describe the position of the parties in 
declaratory judgment cases.
208
 The natural plaintiff is the party who alleges 
to have been wronged—the party who ostensibly has a cause of action for 
coercive relief.
209
 Essentially, it’s the party who should be the plaintiff, had 
it not been beaten to the courthouse by the declaratory, or “artificial,” 
plaintiff.
210
  
Admittedly, the common-law tradition stars the plaintiff as “master of 
the complaint,” allowing him to frame the issues and decide whom to sue, 
what claims to bring, and where to initiate the action.
211
 And, to be sure, the 
Supreme Court has expressed approval
212
 of what one commentator has 
dubbed the “plaintiff’s choice” principle.213 But all of this exists outside the 
declaratory judgment context. No court has explained why the declaratory 
defendant should be pitied for failing to get to the courthouse first, other 
than to express a general distaste for “giv[ing] the alleged wrongdoer a 
choice of forum.”214 In the same way that “[t]he plaintiff’s privilege is so 
ingrained in our jurisprudence, and so rarely challenged on its own terms, 
that it is seldom discussed,” it’s effectively taken for granted that we 
should, for some reason, give preference to the allegedly aggrieved party.
215
  
In a similar vein, no court has ever offered support for the proposition 
that a race to the courthouse is actually “disorderly.”216 As much as one 
might enjoy picturing two men in suits, jostling with each other up the 
courthouse steps and throwing elbows as they sprint to the court clerk’s 
office, that’s obviously not how it works. In fact, the whole idea of a “race” 
is a misnomer that connotes two parties deciding at the same time to file 
                                                                                                                 
 207. 820 F.2d 898, 901 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 208. See Vanneman, supra note 114, at 127–29. 
 209. Ryan, supra note 199, at 168–70. 
 210. See In re Amendt, 169 F. App’x 93, 97 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 211. Vanneman, supra note 114, at 142. 
 212. Id. at 142–43 (citing Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 633 (1964); Gulf Oil 
Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947); Koster v. (Am.) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 
U.S. 518, 524 (1947)). 
 213. Ryan, supra note 199, at 168. 
 214. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd. v. McRae, 953 F. Supp. 223, 224 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
 215. Ryan, supra note 200, at 169. 
 216. See, e.g., Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585, 592 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (quoting 
BORCHARD, supra note 89, at 307), superseded by statute, Act of Aug. 27, 1982, Pub. L. No. 
96-247, 96 Stat. 317 (codified as amended in 35 U.S.C. § 294 (2012)), as recognized in Nat’l 
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 892 F.2d 1066, 1072 (1990). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss4/2
2018]       SHOOT FIRST, LITIGATE LATER 825 
 
 
suit. To steal a line from the Fourth Circuit, “there can be no race to the 
courthouse when only one party is running.”217 
Contrary to the unreasoned view now taken by many courts, except in 
rare circumstances,
218
 courts should stop pitying the natural plaintiff who 
finds itself as the defendant in a declaratory judgment action as opposed to 
the plaintiff in a coercive suit.
219
 The reason? Natural plaintiffs have the 
biggest advantage of all: they get to decide when they’re aggrieved, or, in 
other words, when to assert their rights. And they get to decide, if they so 
choose, when to file suit. In Kerotest Manufacturing Co. v. C-O-Two Fire 
Equipment Co., the Supreme Court talked about both parties getting an 
“equal start in the race to the courthouse.”220 But that’s hardly true; the 
natural plaintiff always has a head start. 
 In most instances, there’s absolutely nothing that requires potential 
plaintiffs to provide notice or warning to the defendant before filing a civil 
action.
221
 The custom of issuing a cease-and-desist demand may have 
benefits to a party who wants to avoid litigation, but it’s certainly not a 
prerequisite to filing one’s case.222 If an aggrieved party so chooses, it could 
file its complaint prior to sending its cease-and-desist, and withhold formal 
service of the complaint for up to ninety days while it attempts to settle the 
dispute.
223
 Because the first-to-file rule is calculated from the time of 
                                                                                                                 
 217. Learning Network, Inc. v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 11 F. App’x 297, 301 (4th 
Cir. 2001). 
 218. See infra Section IV.C. 
 219. Of course, the declaratory defendant will usually become a plaintiff itself through 
the filing of counterclaims. 
 220. 342 U.S. 180, 184 (1952). 
 221. One notable exception would be the “notice and takedown” system under Title II of 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, which grants online service providers safe 
haven from secondary copyright infringement liability. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012). The statute 
requires that on receipt of a takedown notice issued by a copyright holder, the service 
provider must “respond[ ] expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is 
claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity.” Id. § 512(c)(1)(C); see 
also id. § 512(c)(3)(A). The person or entity who posted the alleged infringing material may 
then submit a “counternotice” contesting the allegation of infringement, which triggers a ten- 
to fourteen-day period in which the copyright holder may file suit against the poster for 
infringement. Id. § 512(g)(2). If no suit is filed, the online service provider may restore 
access to the material with no risk of copyright liability. Id. § 512(g)(4).  
 222. See White & Case, LLP, The Risk of Sending Cease and Desist Letters Pre-Filing in 
Patent Litigations, LEXOLOGY (Dec. 10, 2010), https://www.lexology.com/library/ 
detail.aspx?g=5a6dd013-8c6b-47d5-b1f4-588c7389c444.  
 223. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m). 
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filing—and not service—a natural plaintiff can easily protect its forum-
selection right at a cost of only a few hundred dollars in filing fees.
224
 
B. Potential Criticisms 
Defenders of the natural plaintiff concept, as well as those who see the 
race to the courthouse as “disorderly,” will advance at least three arguments 
in favor of the anticipatory litigation exception. The first is that in a 
declaratory judgment case, the defendant will effectively bear the burden of 
proof, particularly when it advances counterclaims.
225
 As the party bearing 
the effective burden of proof, shouldn’t it at least be given the choice all 
other plaintiffs are given—the choice of forum? 
Contrary to this argument, it’s not as if the natural plaintiff will be 
blindsided by a declaratory judgment action. Because jurisdiction under the 
Declaratory Judgment Act is tempered by the Constitution’s Article III 
“case or controversy” requirement, a declaratory plaintiff can’t even get in 
the courthouse door until there’s a dispute.226 Moreover, the dispute doesn’t 
arise until the natural plaintiff raises it, typically through a demand or 
cease-and-desist letter.
227
 So, the natural plaintiff will always have the 
option of initiating the litigation, thereby establishing the forum, if it 
chooses. If the case is close enough that the natural plaintiff doesn’t think it 
can carry its burden of proof in a different forum, perhaps it should consider 
filing suit before it issues the cease-and-desist letter and delay service for 
up to ninety days.
228
 
Further, one should not forget that the “plaintiff’s choice” doctrine is not 
absolute.
229
 Forum non-conveniens, transfer of venue, personal jurisdiction, 
federal-question jurisdiction, and diversity jurisdiction are all qualifications 
on the notion that the plaintiff gets to choose the forum.
230
 When applying 
those doctrines, we don’t lament the fact that they may serve as a 
disadvantage to the party with the burden of proof.
231
 Adding one more 
possible qualification—the first-to-file rule’s interplay with the Declaratory 
Judgment Act—hardly seems like an unreasonable constraint on the 
presumption of plaintiff’s choice. 
                                                                                                                 
 224. See Prod. Eng’g & Mfg., Inc. v. Barnes, 424 F.2d 42, 44 (10th Cir. 1970). 
 225. See Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd. v. McRae, 953 F. Supp. 223, 224 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
 226. See Hyatt Int’l Corp. v. Coco, 302 F.3d 707, 712 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 227. See Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Guthrie, 233 F.3d 532, 534–35 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 228. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m); White & Case, supra note 222. 
 229. Ryan, supra note 199, at 168–70. 
 230. Id. 
 231. See id. 
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The second argument critics will likely raise is that allowing purely 
anticipatory suits only encourages plaintiffs to forego efforts at pre-suit 
negotiations and settlement.
232
 This is a constant refrain issued by courts 
dismissing mirror-image declaratory judgment cases. The Southern District 
of New York once argued that “[p]otential plaintiffs should be encouraged 
to attempt settlement discussions (in good faith and with dispatch) prior to 
filing lawsuits without fear that the defendant will be permitted to take 
advantage of the opportunity to institute litigation in a district of its own 
choosing before plaintiff files an already drafted complaint.”233 Indeed, the 
very solution proposed here—that natural plaintiffs should sue first if they 
value their forum-selection right—would certainly lead to an increase in 
lawsuit filings, which, the critics would say, is bad policy.
234
 
But an increase in filings does not necessarily result in an increase in 
unsettled cases or trials. The argument that a case has a lesser chance of 
amicable resolution once it is filed lacks any empirical (or even logical) 
support. In fact, arguably, filing the complaint before issuing a cease-and-
desist could aid settlement in ways that an unaccompanied demand 
wouldn’t.235 For instance, a defendant faced with an actual lawsuit—as 
opposed to merely a threat—may be more likely to comply with a cease-
and-desist warning. Likewise, a defendant who would have otherwise 
reacted by filing a declaratory judgment action in a friendly venue may 
decide litigation isn’t worth it in the plaintiff’s chosen forum. Moreover, 
it’s not as if filing a complaint drives the parties’ costs up in a way that 
makes settlement less likely. Filing fees are, at most, several hundred 
dollars.
236
 Of course, it’s true that this route may require plaintiffs to draft 
                                                                                                                 
 232. See, e.g., AmSouth Bank v. Dale, 386 F.3d 763, 788 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Courts take a 
dim view of declaratory plaintiffs who file their suits mere days or weeks before the coercive 
suits filed by a ‘natural plaintiff’ and who seem to have done so for the purpose of acquiring 
a favorable forum. Allowing declaratory actions in these situations can deter settlement 
negotiations and encourage races to the courthouse, as potential plaintiffs must file before 
approaching defendants for settlement negotiations, under pain of a declaratory suit.”). 
 233. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Schneider, 435 F. Supp. 742, 747–48 (S.D.N.Y. 
1977). 
 234. See Charles Schwab & Co. v. Duffy, No. C98-03612 MMC, 1998 WL 879659, at *1 
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 1998). 
 235. See Hyatt Int’l Corp. v. Coco, 302 F.3d 707, 711 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Declaratory 
judgment actions serve an important role in our legal system insofar as they permit prompt 
settlement of actual controversies and establish the legal rights and obligations that will 
govern the parties’ relationship in the future.”). 
 236. U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE W. DIST. OF WASH., A PRO SE GUIDE TO FILING YOUR 
LAWSUIT IN FEDERAL COURT (Dec. 30, 2015), http://www.wawd.uscourts.gov/sites/ 
wawd/files/ProSeManual4_8_2013wforms.pdf. 
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their complaints—which also costs money in the form of attorney’s fees—
at an earlier stage. Again, though, the cost of drafting a complaint is not so 
exorbitant as to make settlement more difficult. 
A third, much weaker argument could potentially be raised. Many courts 
(including the Supreme Court) and commentators have discussed the 
Declaratory Judgment Act in terms of public benefit.
237
 For example, the 
Supreme Court has warned that courts’ discretion to accept or reject 
declaratory filings should be “exercised in the public interest.”238 Other 
courts, in emphasizing the importance of a tribunal’s discretion, have gone 
straight to the source—Professor Borchard himself—to quote the “general 
rule that the declaration is an instrument of practical relief and will not be 
issued where it does not serve a useful purpose.”239 In this light, many have 
argued that pure forum shopping—even if non-sinister—fails to serve a 
“useful purpose,” and therefore courts have some sort of duty to root out 
cases that are merely “races for res judicata.”240  
Of course, Professor Borchard was right, and the declaration should be 
“an instrument of practical relief.”241 But critics extend Professor 
Borchard’s language beyond what its logic will bear. To elevate the “useful 
purpose” language to suggest there must be some nobility or public benefit 
to each and every declaratory judgment action is, frankly, ridiculous. These 
are most often private disputes between private parties, and even suits that 
do not serve a grand end can serve a useful purpose to the parties. 
Furthermore, and more fundamentally, focusing on the public interest 
ignores the primary purpose of declaratory judgments.
242
 Remember: prior 
to the advent of the declaratory action, a party who was alleged to be 
infringing another’s intellectual property had no choice but to either cease 
its conduct or continue along while the proverbial Sword of Damocles 
                                                                                                                 
 237. Eccles v. Peoples Bank of Lakewood Vill., Cal., 333 U.S. 426, 431 (1948). “It is 
always the duty of a court of equity to strike a proper balance between the needs of the 
plaintiff and the consequences of giving the desired relief.” Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. See, e.g., Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585, 592 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (quoting 
BORCHARD, supra note 89, at 307), superseded by statute, Act of Aug. 27, 1982, Pub. L. No. 
96-247, 96 Stat. 317 (codified as amended in 35 U.S.C. § 294 (2012)), as recognized in Nat’l 
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 892 F.2d 1066, 1072 (1990). 
 240. Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 746 F.2d 323, 326 (7th Cir. 1984); 
Millard, 531 F.2d at 592. 
 241. BORCHARD, supra note 89, at 307. 
 242. Doernberg & Mushlin, supra note 23, at 554–55. 
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perilously hung over its head, waiting for the eventual day when the natural 
plaintiff chose to file suit.
243
 
It has always been the purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act to 
enable mirror-image litigation.
244
 By its very nature, that type of case will 
be anticipatory.
245
 As a result, to fully effectuate the purpose of the law, 
courts should (for the most part) stop worrying about whether an “artificial” 
plaintiff is gaming the system to fix a case’s venue. 
C. A Reasonable Solution 
Undoubtedly, the Declaratory Judgment Act should not be used as a tool 
to frustrate the litigation process.
246
 There are three obvious ways in which 
that could be done: (1) seeking delay; (2) seeking a forum with more 
favorable procedural or substantive law; and (3) violating a private 
agreement entered between the parties. Accordingly, when courts focus on 
whether the declaratory plaintiff has engaged in procedural fencing, it 
should only inquire as to those possibilities, rather than a concern for a 
general “race for res judicata.”247 
As to delay, any international patent practitioner will be aware of what’s 
known as “The Italian Torpedo.”248 The term refers to an opening strategy 
in patent litigation where potential infringers will initiate an action in a 
jurisdiction with a very slow legal process (Italy, primarily), which, under 
European Union Law, forces courts in other jurisdictions to stay any 
infringement actions relating to the same patents and parties.
249
 That often 
results in cases being tied up in Italian courts indefinitely, thereby avoiding 
any resolution.
250
 It’s hard to point to any concrete examples of similar 
tactics occurring in U.S. federal courts, but certainly, if there’s evidence 
that the declaratory plaintiff filed in a particular venue to see the case 
                                                                                                                 
 243. Id. 
 244. Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931, 937 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 245. Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Holmes Cty., 343 F.3d 383, 391–92 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 246. See id. 
 247. See Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 746 F.2d 323, 326 (7th Cir. 
1984). 
 248. See Studio Legale Jacobacci & Associati, Italian Supreme Court News: The Rise of 
the Italian Torpedo, LEXOLOGY (July 19, 2013), https://www.lexology.com/library/ 
detail.aspx?g=8c7b00c4-80dd-43e4-89f3-fdd453a19420 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
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languish in a glacial court docket, then that would be one reason to dismiss 
the case for improper procedural fencing.
251
 
The second way in which the Declaratory Judgment Act can be 
subverted is that discussed by the Fifth Circuit in Sherwin-Williams.
252
 
Undoubtedly, a party should not be able to use the statute to gain access to a 
substantively or procedurally more advantageous federal forum.
253
 But 
that’s usually not an issue in intellectual property cases, which are typically 
filed in federal court regardless.
254
 As the Northern District of Illinois 
pointed out in the patent context, “[a] declaratory judgment plaintiff may 
achieve a more convenient forum, but cannot achieve a tactical advantage 
in choice of controlling precedent” because federal law doesn’t change 
from circuit to circuit.
255
 Accordingly, so long as the forum shopping is not 
“outcome based,” courts should not concern themselves with anticipatory 
suits.
256
 
Finally, courts should certainly exercise their discretion to dismiss 
declaratory judgment actions that have been filed despite a definite, 
concrete agreement by the declaratory plaintiff not to do so. One 
commentator has suggested this exception in terms of “bad faith conduct in 
settlement discussions.”257 While I generally agree with the sentiment that 
parties shouldn’t be able to take advantage of an equitable remedy by acting 
in bad faith, parties and courts will no doubt struggle with what constitutes 
“bad faith.” 
A perfect example is the Thomas Kinkade case.
258
 There, the court 
thought the declaratory plaintiff’s filing while engaged in settlement talks 
was evidence of what amounted to bad faith,
259
 but it failed to articulate any 
                                                                                                                 
 251. Of course, it would hard to envision a district court admitting that its own docket is 
so slow as to encourage such a filing. 
 252. Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Holmes Cty., 343 F.3d 383, 391–92 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 253. See id. 
 254. See, e.g., Easton-Bell Sports, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., No. 13-cv-
00283 NC, 2013 WL 1283463, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013) (holding that in a trademark 
dispute, the operative substantive law is federal, which eliminates the motivation to 
improperly forum shop). 
 255. K&F Mfg. Co. v. W. Litho Plate & Supply Co., 831 F. Supp. 661, 664 (N.D. Ind. 
1993). 
 256. Hill, supra note 22, at 253–56. 
 257. Id. at 256. 
 258. Mill Creek Press, Inc. v. Thomas Kinkade Co., No. CIVA.3:04-CV-1213-G, 2004 
WL 2607987 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 2004). 
 259. Admittedly, the court never used the specific term “bad faith,” although it did 
characterize the plaintiff’s conduct as contrary to the defendant’s “good faith.” Id. at *9. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss4/2
2018]       SHOOT FIRST, LITIGATE LATER 831 
 
 
helpful standard for that finding.
260
 For example, would it have been bad 
faith to file the declaratory action before engaging in settlement discussions 
(in other words, immediately upon receiving the cease-and-desist letter)? If 
the answer is yes, then why involve settlement talks in the equation at all? 
If the answer is no, doesn’t a pre-negotiation suit filing “rob” the natural 
plaintiff of its forum choice all the same? Otherwise put: how is a natural 
plaintiff any more disadvantaged by a pre-negotiation suit than one that is 
filed during negotiations? 
In Mill Creek, both parties had assured each other they wouldn’t file suit 
without first informing the other, and the declaratory plaintiff broke that 
promise when it filed.
261
 But does that materially change things? Would it 
not have been in bad faith if the alleged infringer had called or written and 
said, “pursuant to our agreement, we hereby notify you that we will be 
filing a declaratory judgment action in sixty seconds?” Of course not. But it 
would have complied with the parties’ agreement. 
Had the Mill Creek promise been better articulated—for example, a 
concrete acknowledgement by the alleged infringer that it would not file 
before giving its accuser reasonable notice
262—then that’s certainly a 
different story. A party should not be able to “lure” another into a false 
sense of security through definite, concrete assurances it will not exercise 
its ability to file a declaratory judgment suit.
263
 But absent such assurances, 
courts should be wary of employing a “bad faith” standard that fails to 
provide guidelines on acceptable conduct. 
In short, courts should not institute “a presumption that a first filed 
declaratory judgment action should be dismissed or stayed in favor of the 
substantive suit,” or require that “the declaratory judgment plaintiff should 
have the burden of showing persuasive cause why its suit should not be 
enjoined.”264 Such a rule unquestionably frustrates the purpose of the 
remedy, which is to relieve alleged infringers of “the Hobson’s choice of 
foregoing their rights or acting at their peril.”265 Courts absolutely should 
                                                                                                                 
 260. See id. 
 261. Id. at *8. 
 262. Of course, parties could disagree about what is “reasonable.” In this instance, I think 
it’s clear it would mean sufficient time for the “natural plaintiff” to file suit if it so chose. 
 263. See Easton-Bell Sports, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., No. 13–cv–00283 
NC, 2013 WL 1283463, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013) (citing lack of evidence that 
Plaintiff negotiations were in bad faith “or that they were merely a ruse” to ensure a 
successful race to the courthouse). 
 264. Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of America-
UAW v. Dana Corp., No. 3:99CV7603, 1999 WL 33237054, *6 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 6, 1999). 
 265. Tex. Emp’rs Ins. Ass’n v. Jackson, 862 F.2d 491, 505 (5th Cir. 1988). 
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employ an “improper forum shopping” or “procedural fencing” factor in 
their discretionary tests. But they should also be careful to limit any 
analysis under such a factor to whether the suit has been brought for delay, 
whether it has been brought to obtain a substantive or procedural legal 
advantage, or whether it has been brought despite definite, concrete 
assurances to the contrary. 
V. An Alternative Approach 
Convincing courts to abandon their hatred of anticipatory declaratory 
judgment actions is easier said than done. Assume, then, that some (or even 
most) courts will continue to insist on looking upon mirror-image 
declaratory judgment actions with a scrutinizing eye for signs that the 
plaintiff is only trying to win a race for venue rights. Is there anything else 
they can do to better define the rights of litigants and provide more clarity? 
Indeed, courts could be clearer about what constitutes a “race to res 
judicata” as opposed to a valid effort at vindicating one’s rights. In other 
words, what factors should all courts examine? The second suggestion is far 
more revolutionary: If courts really want to ensure that declaratory 
plaintiffs are not “abusing” the purposes of the Declaratory Judgment Act, 
why not require them to provide fair notice to the natural plaintiff before 
filing suit? If a trial court’s discretion is as broad as most courts purport it 
to be, might that kind of imposition be permissible? 
A. The Search for Certainty 
The primary problem with the state of the law is that it leaves potential 
litigants in the dark about what constitutes an improper anticipatory suit and 
what constitutes an appropriate utilization of the Declaratory Judgment Act. 
Some courts, however, have done a marvelous job of identifying a set of 
factors that, if followed, would provide a workable framework for increased 
predictability. 
Take, for example, the Second Circuit. In BuddyUSA, Inc. v. Recording 
Industry Ass’n of America, the court had before it a copyright dispute that 
began when one of the defendants sent a demand letter to the plaintiff.
266
 
The letter alleged that operation of the plaintiff’s online file sharing device 
violated copyright law and closed with a demand that plaintiff 
“immediately take steps to prevent the dissemination of infringing sound 
recordings owned by our member companies.”267 The letter warned that the 
                                                                                                                 
 266. 21 F. App’x 52, 54 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 267. Id. 
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plaintiff “had one week to comply,” and that if it did not, the defendant 
would have “little choice” but to “seek additional legal remedies.”268 The 
parties’ stories differ at that point, but suffice it to say that some six months 
later, the plaintiff filed for declaratory relief.
269
 The defendant claimed that 
throughout that time, the plaintiff was engaging in behavior designed to 
delay legal action.
270
 
The court appropriately started its analysis by invoking the first-to-file 
rule and its “special circumstances” exceptions: “One type of special 
circumstance is present where the first, declaratory action is filed in 
response to a direct threat of litigation.”271 Citing to its own decision in 
Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., the court issued the familiar refrain that 
“the federal declaratory judgment is not a prize to the winner of a race to 
the courthouses.”272 
But what followed was a very clear course of reasoning to shape the 
analysis: “Following Factors, district courts have typically found an 
exception to the first-filed rule where declaratory actions are filed in 
response to demand letters that give specific warnings as to deadlines and 
subsequent legal action.”273 The court cited to three cases as examples of 
the “specific warnings” test being met—one where a demand letter 
threatened suit if the sender’s claim was not satisfied by a specific date, one 
where the demand stated that if the recipient’s decision “remains unaltered, 
we will commence suit in a court of appropriate jurisdiction in forty eight 
(48) hours,” and one where the letter stated the sender’s “intention to file 
suit in California if settlement negotiations were not fruitful.”274 
The court then contrasted those cases with examples of suits “filed in 
response to . . . notice letter[s] that do[] not explicitly ‘inform[] a defendant 
of the intention to file suit, a filing date, and/or a specific forum for the 
                                                                                                                 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. at 55. 
 272. 579 F.2d 215, 219 (2d Cir. 1978) (quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 119 n.12 
(1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting)), abrogated by Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579 (2d 
Cir. 1990). 
 273. BuddyUSA, 21 F. App’x at 55 (emphasis added). 
 274. Id. (citing and quoting first Chicago Ins. Co. v. Holzer, No. 00 Civ. 1062(SAS), 
2000 WL 777907, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2000), then Mondo, Inc. v. Spitz, No. 97 Civ. 
4822(LAP), 1998 WL 17744, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 1998), then Fed. Ins. Co. v. May 
Dep’t Stores Co., 808 F. Supp. 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)). 
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filing of the suit.’”275 Specifically, demands that “mentioned ‘the possibility 
of legal actions’ without specifying date or forum,” and “stated that the 
sender ‘hoped to avoid litigation’” would be more indicative of “an attempt 
to initiate settlement negotiations rather than notice of suit.”276 
Like the Second Circuit’s “specific warning” analysis, district courts in 
the Ninth Circuit have looked to whether the declaratory plaintiff had 
“specific, concrete indications that a suit by the defendant was 
imminent.”277 For example, a demand that “stated unequivocally that 
‘unless a settlement is reached within five (5) business days a lawsuit will 
be filed,’” or one that “warned that failure to execute and comply with the 
terms proposed by defendant by the specified deadline would result in 
litigation,” give rise to a warning of imminence.278 
In contrast, courts have not found specific, concrete indications of 
imminence “where [defendant’s] letter stated that failure to comply with its 
terms would force it to ‘take further legal action, but indicated an amicable 
resolution should be possible.’”279 Likewise, demands that stated “If we 
cannot get your cooperation . . . I have been instructed to take all necessary 
legal remedies and actions . . . including instituting civil actions”; “If I do 
not hear from you, I have been asked to commence legal action”; and “[I] 
look forward to a speedy and amicable final resolution,” did not sufficiently 
communicate the threat of an imminent lawsuit.
280
 
The takeaway here is a simple one. Courts need to clearly articulate a 
standard that identifies what constitutes a case brought merely in 
anticipation of litigation. That standard should mirror the Northern District 
of California’s language: a declaratory judgment action is improperly 
anticipatory if it is filed despite specific, concrete indications that a lawsuit 
by the defendant was imminent.
281
 Evidence of imminence should include: 
                                                                                                                 
 275. Id. (quoting J. Lyons & Co., Ltd. v. Republic of Tea, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 486, 491 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995)). 
 276. Id. at 55–56 (citing and quoting first J. Lyons, 892 F. Supp. at 491, then Emp’rs Ins. 
of Wasau v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 763 F. Supp. 46, 49 (S.D.N.Y 1991). 
 277. Ward v. Follett Corp., 158 F.R.D. 645, 648 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (emphasis added). 
 278. Easton-Bell Sports, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., No. 13-cv-00283 NC, 
2013 WL 1283463, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013) (citing and quoting first Inherent.com v. 
Martindale-Hubbell, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1099–1100 (N.D. Cal. 2006), then Xoxide, Inc. 
v. Ford Motor Co., 448 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1193 (C.D. Cal. 2006)). 
 279. Id. (quoting Intersearch Worldwide, Ltd. v. Intersearch Grp., Inc., 544 F. Supp. 2d 
949, 961 (N.D. Cal. 2008)). 
 280. Id. at *5. 
 281. See id. at *4. 
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• The specificity of action to be taken (i.e., “filing a lawsuit,” as 
opposed to “exploring legal options”);282 
• Identification of a specific and impending date on or by which 
suit would be filed;
283
 and 
• Identification of a particular court in which suit would be 
filed.
284
 
Certainly, if all potential plaintiffs were that clear in their cease-and-
desist letters or other behavior, it would be hard to argue that a lawsuit filed 
prior to the expiration of the letter’s provided date was anything other than 
anticipatory. Conversely, if natural plaintiffs fail to provide that type of 
notice, they should hardly be upset when the declaratory plaintiff files first. 
B. Declaratory Notice 
Admittedly, even if courts adopt the framework suggested above, it 
won’t solve all cases. For example, in BuddyUSA, despite the Second 
Circuit having clear guidelines to apply, the court admitted that “[i]n the 
case before us, the record is ambiguous as to whether the instant action was 
improperly anticipatory. Both in their briefs and at oral argument, the 
plaintiffs and defendants have both made a persuasive case in support of 
their interpretation of events.”285 The trial court had found the declaratory 
filing to be non-anticipatory, and the Second Circuit opined that “[i]n light 
of the ambiguities which are present, we are not convinced that the District 
Court abused its discretion,” pointing to the fact that “[t]he notice letter was 
somewhat vague about what legal action, if any, the Recording Industry 
planned to take.”286 
So perhaps there’s another way. Would it in any way frustrate the 
purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act if a declaratory plaintiff was 
required to provide reasonable notice of its filing? Up to this point, this 
Article has focused on the tension between the primary purpose of the 
statute—to allow alleged infringers to file mirror-image actions to vindicate 
their conduct—and a vague, ill-defined anticipatory race-to-the-courthouse 
exception. But little, if any, downside exists to instituting a requirement that 
                                                                                                                 
 282. See Intersearch Worldwide, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 961.  
 283. See Learning Network, Inc. v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 11 F. App’x 297, 301–02 
(4th Cir. 2001). 
 284. BuddyUSA, Inc. v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., 21 F. App’x 52, 55 (2d Cir. 
2001). 
 285. Id. at 56. 
 286. Id. 
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before a declaratory judgment case is filed, its plaintiff should notify the 
defendant of an intent to file, thereby giving the defendant ample 
opportunity to assume his or her natural plaintiff rights. 
Of course, there will always be cases that, for one reason or another, 
don’t allow for notice to be given. Perhaps the exact identity of the 
declaratory defendant is unknown or he or she is otherwise unreachable. 
Perhaps there are circumstances that require an immediate or emergency 
filing, such that notice is not feasible. These (likely rare) instances can be 
easily accommodated with a “compelling circumstances” (or similarly 
worded) exception to the notice requirement. 
Similarly, it would be helpful to provide guidance to what constitutes 
“reasonable” notice. Should it be “reasonable” under the circumstances of 
the case? Ideally not, as that would likely lead to just as much uncertainty 
as the existing quagmire of caselaw. A period of seven days from the date 
of notice seems reasonable—certainly enough time for the natural plaintiff 
to exercise its rights if it so intends. 
Finally, what should the notice look like? Section V.A. provides some 
guidance. A formal letter, sent via reasonable communication channels 
(mail, email, facsimile) to the same individual who sent the cease-and-
desist or demand letter giving rise to the dispute, informing the recipient: 
• That the sender intends on filing a declaratory judgment action; 
• Of a date certain, that is at least seven days from the date of the 
letter, on or after which the suit will be filed; and 
• Of the court in which the suit will be filed. 
To be sure, this should be Congress’s task. It could, if it desired, pass 
legislation to this effect by amending the Declaratory Judgment Act.
287
 But 
assuming (safely) that Congress won’t venture to legislatively solve the 
anticipatory lawsuit conundrum, could courts institute such an approach 
themselves? 
That answer is less clear and boils down to a question of the bounds of 
courts’ discretion. But if the Supreme Court’s caselaw is any indication, it 
should be permissible: 
Since its inception, the Declaratory Judgment Act has been 
understood to confer on federal courts unique and substantial 
discretion in deciding whether to declare the rights of 
litigants. . . . The statute’s textual commitment to discretion, and 
                                                                                                                 
 287. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202 (2012). 
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the breadth of leeway we have always understood it to suggest, 
distinguish the declaratory judgment context from other areas of 
the law in which concepts of discretion surface. . . . We have 
repeatedly characterized the Declaratory Judgment Act as “an 
enabling Act, which confers a discretion on the courts rather than 
an absolute right upon the litigant.” . . . When all is said and 
done, we have concluded, “the propriety of declaratory relief in a 
particular case will depend upon a circumspect sense of its 
fitness informed by the teachings and experience concerning the 
functions and extent of federal judicial power.”288 
I don’t mean to suggest that courts could (or should) institute a “notice” 
requirement and dismiss declaratory judgment actions that fail to abide. 
However broad federal courts’ discretion might be, it shouldn’t extend so 
far as to allow them to impose hard filing prerequisites that ought to be 
created legislatively. 
Instead, the approach should evolve organically, over time. It could start 
with circuit and district courts suggesting that litigants employ the notice 
tactic as a means of proving their cases are not improperly anticipatory. Just 
as many circuits have identified a set of factors to assist them in 
determining whether a declaratory filing should be dismissed,
289
 they can 
easily add a factor contemplating “whether the plaintiff provided reasonable 
notice of its intent to sue” in addition to their existing considerations. 
Alternatively, they can make clear that the giving of notice helps inform the 
analysis as to the already existing “forum shopping,” “anticipation of 
litigation,” or “fairness” factors.290 As time goes on, courts could rely more 
heavily on a plaintiff’s failure to provide notice. That’s not to say it would 
become appropriate to dismiss a case solely because no notice was given, 
but again, as the courts continue to ask for it in their written opinions, 
                                                                                                                 
 288. Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286–87 (1995) (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted). 
 289. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mhoon, 31 F.3d 979, 983 (10th Cir. 1994) 
(“[A] trial judge . . . . should ask [1] whether a declaratory action would settle the 
controversy; [2] whether it would serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal relations at 
issue; [3] whether the declaratory remedy is being used merely for the purpose of 
“procedural fencing” or “to provide an arena for a race to res judicata”; [4] whether use of a 
declaratory action would increase friction between our federal and state courts and 
improperly encroach upon state jurisdiction; and [5] whether there is an alternative remedy 
which is better or more effective.”) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Green, 825 F.2d 1061, 1061 
(6th Cir. 1987)). 
 290. See St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Trejo, 39 F.3d 585, 590–91 (5th Cir. 1994). 
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litigants should eventually get the message that it’s something courts want 
to see. 
VI. Conclusion 
Declaratory judgment actions are an incredibly important component of 
many areas of law, intellectual-property cases being no exception.
291
 
Nevertheless, judges routinely exercise their discretion under the 
Declaratory Judgment Act to decline jurisdiction over cases that they see as 
an attempt by the declaratory plaintiff—or alleged wrongdoer—to steal the 
aggrieved party’s choice of forum.292 
Until now, federal circuit and district courts have failed to articulate a 
uniform approach that adequately advances the purposes of the Declaratory 
Judgment Act.
293
 That can change in three ways. First, courts should 
reevaluate their distaste for “races to the courthouse” that wouldn’t result in 
any articulable outcome-based advantages to the declaratory plaintiff.
294
 
Second, if the courts insist on treating anticipatory suits with a presumption 
of invalidity, they should at the very least identify and apply a clear test that 
informs litigants what an anticipatory suit looks like.
295
 And third, Congress 
should amend the Declaratory Judgment Act to generally require that 
plaintiffs provide reasonable notice of their suit prior to filing.
296
 If 
Congress refuses to act, courts should begin to implement the notice 
approach on their own by treating the giving of notice as a strong indication 
of a properly filed declaratory case.
297
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